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I. INTRODUCTION
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
intervention in Kosovo sets a unique precedent under
international law. Hailed as a humanitarian intervention, the
Alliance's military puissance epitomized justice to a world
inundated by the innumerable images of desperate ethnic
Albanians fleeing the ravages of war. Kosovo, torn by ethnic
conflict, became a vivid public reminder of the Holocaust. As the
fog of war lifts from the mountainous region, the legality of
Operation Allied Force comes into question. As the intervention
lacked formal Security Council authorization, it was essentially
based solely on naked calls for humanitarian relief-an act
amounting to a brazen bypass of the U.N. Charter, principles of
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international law, and the laws of war.1 Although international
law recognizes a limited set of circumstances where humanitarian
interventions do not require Security Council authorization, such
interventions are invariably subjugated to the laws of war, namely
the principle of proportionality.3
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions sets out the basis of
the proportionality doctrine. This doctrine asserts that any
military intervention must balance the military advantage sought
with the expected civilian injury and damage that would result
from an attack.4 In light of this principle, Operation Allied Force
appears to be an intervention of questionable nature. The notion
that a balance was achieved is undermined by several facts. First
and foremost, the air strikes inflicted devastating damage upon the
civilian population throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY), destroying numerous civilian structures and resulting in
the deaths of many civilians.5 The aftereffects of the air strikes
continue to represent an omnipresent threat to the population, as
thousands of undetonated bombs remain peppered throughout
the FRY.6 Additionally, environmental damage resulting from air
strikes continues to pose grave threats of contamination to
civilians .7
In Part I of this Article, the events surrounding the Kosovo
conflict are summarized by describing the leading political and
social causes that led to its development. Part II delineates the
established legal structures that govern the use of force under
international law, humanitarian interventions, and the doctrine of
proportionality. Part III applies these legal principles to the
Kosovo conflict and Part IV concludes that while a humanitarian
intervention sans Security Council authorization may have been
initially warranted by the rampant conditions within Kosovo,
ultimately, the degree of force utilized by NATO forces was
1. See discussion infra Part II.A.
2. See discussion infra Part II.B.
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
4. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.c.iv.
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.2, Part III.A.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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excessive and in violation of Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions.
II. HISTORY AND THE Kosovo CIVIL WAR
A civil war rarely develops from purely contemporaneous
events; rather, it matures over time until it is ripe for an explosion
of dissension. The events surrounding the breakdown of
Yugoslavia and the subsequent civil wars of the past decade have
been the result of centuries of dramatic events, which have torn
the people of the former Yugoslavia into various parcels claiming
inherent rights to nationalism.8  The conflict in Kosovo is the
result of separatism, tinged with religious, cultural, and political
overtones, surfacing at the start of the 1990s and developing into a
violent international conflict at the close of the century. 9  A
deeper understanding of Kosovo and its conflict may be achieved
by examining the events leading up to the development of the
Kosovo Civil War, and then analyzing the international
community's manner of intervention, its envisioned goals, and its
justifications for the use of force.
A. The Kosovo Civil War
1. Events Leading up to Civil War
The conflict in Kosovo ignited as a result of two opposing
forces: the Kosovar Albanians' demands for an independent
Kosovo and Slobodan Milosevic's refusal to bestow independence
upon a land deeply regarded by the Serbian community as a
symbol of Serbian history and religion. 10 Although the events of
8. See Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples 250 (1985).
9. Id.
10. The modern Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is composed of Serbia and
Montenegro, with Serbia comprising Serbia proper and the two provinces of Vojvodina
and Kosovo-Metohija (most often referred to as Kosovo). See id. These two provinces
were created in 1974 by Josip Broz Tito, the Croat communist leader of Yugoslavia after
World War II (WWII). Id. Tito gave both provinces the right to veto any decision of the
Serbian Parliament as well as the right to enact their own laws while remaining subject to
the laws of Serbia. Id. Although the provinces enjoyed extensive autonomy, they were
nevertheless part of the Republic of Serbia and did not have the right to secede from
Serbia, as opposed to every other republic within Yugoslavia that enjoyed such a right
(Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro). See id.
The provinces' right to veto was removed in 1989 by Slobodan Milosevic and the right to
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the past decade ultimately led to the Alliance's intervention on
March 24, 1999, the underlying causes of the Kosovo civil war
stem from many years ago.' Initial dissatisfaction and sentiments
of nationalism by Kosovar Albanians were evident after World
War II (WWII). 12 Nationalism, however, was kept in check under
Tito, the Croat Communist leader of Yugoslavia from the end of
WWII until 1980.13 Under Josip Broz Tito, Albanians were able
to fully develop their own culture, as did any ethnic group
inhabiting the region of Yugoslavia. 14  Enacted measures were
directed at providing greater economic and social stability to
Kosovo. 15  Ultimately, it was the death of Tito, the growth of
nationalism, and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic that precipitated
Yugoslavia to its extinction. 16
After widespread protest in 198117 and an increase in
violence and harassment against Kosovar Serbs,'8 the Serbs
enact their own laws was restricted. See id.
Because Albanians in Kosovo constitute over two-thirds of the Kosovar
population, they claim the right to independence from Serbia. See id. Serbs claim that
Kosovo has been the cradle of Serbian culture and religion for centuries and that the
Albanian population reached the majority in Kosovo only gradually after the end of
WWII. See id. While it is certain that Albanians constitute the majority in Kosovo, Serbs
have lived in the region since the 7th century when their first kingdom was formed. See id.
The Serbs lost their independence to the Turks after the defeat of the battle of Kosovo in
1389. See id. Until then, Kosovo was the seed of Serbian culture, history, and heritage.
See id. The region is considered to be the "Serbian Jerusalem" because Kosovo has over
1,000 Serbian-Christian orthodox churches and monasteries, and the Serbian Orthodox
Church currently owns one-third of the land within Kosovo. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 258-60, 271.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 250. In the 1960s, the Yugoslav government provided that the Albanian
emblem would represent Kosovo and that the University of Pristina employ strictly
Albanian professors in order to develop an awareness of the national culture of the
Albanian people. See id.. There was also a revision of statutes, creating an "ethnic key"
principle that effectively provided that in all important committees, each republic was
adequately represented. Id After the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution under Tito,
Yugoslavia attempted to improve the economic situation and disparity within its republics
by providing new methods to encourage development of poorer areas (such as Kosovo).
Id. at 269. Such methods included the use of administrative allocations through the federal
budget; the establishment of a fund into which each republic contributed a fixed
percentage of its gross national product; and special amounts added to assist Kosovo, the
least developed region. Id. at 269-70.
16. Id. at 271-75.
17. Tito died on May 4, 1980. Id at 271. As explained by Professor Singleton, without
the control of Tito, the frustrations and sentiments of nationalism within Kosovo
eventually grew into a full-blown protest in 1981. Id. at 271-75. The unemployment rate
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sought protection from the government through various petitions
and demands. 19 In 1983, Kosovar Serbs demanded the protection
of Serbian and federal authorities from Albanians who, the Serbs
alleged, were violating their human rights.20 As explained by
Professor Julie Mertus and according to Serbian sources, the
number of Serbs and Montenegrins leaving Kosovo rose to 30,000
had been rising among Albanians; the social and economic rift between privileged and
underprivileged (whether Albanian or Serb) increased; and Serbs continued to hold, for
historical reasons, relatively privileged positions. Id. at 273. Militant Albanians harassed
Serb students, and Serbian villages, churches, and graveyards were desecrated. Id.
Finally, the storm broke in March 1981. Id. at 274. Students from the University of
Pristina began demonstrating against poor food and housing conditions as well as the
declining opportunities for graduates. Id. The disturbances spread and by April 3, 1981,
the demonstrators had drawn in workers, and the demonstrations took an openly
nationalist character. Id.
Violence was shown to Serbs and Montenegrins living in the province. Demands
were made for full republican status for Kosovo. More extreme elements
demanded the inclusion of the Albanian-speaking areas of Macedonia in the
proposed republic, and even the attachment of an enlarged Kosovo to the
neighbouring state of Albania.
Id. Fearing the disintegration of the state, the federal authorities reacted. See id. It is
estimated that the violence between the police and demonstrators resulted in eleven
persons killed and fifty-seven injured. Id. Martial law was declared, students were sent
home, and the province was isolated from the rest of Yugoslavia. Id. In an attempt to
remedy the situation, the federal government promised increased economic aid and
implemented a drive against corruption (there were claims that federal aid had been
misappropriated). Id.
18. See id. at 273.
However, it is important to point out here that all these events [demonstrations
in 1968 and 19811 were accompanied and marked by increasing persecution of
the Serbs living in Kosovo and Metohija. The same methods were applied as
were recorded in 19th century documents and spoken tradition: murder, rape,
beatings, psychological and moral pressure, illegal possessions, land-stealing,
destruction of crops, livestock and forests, social and legal discrimination,
outvoting and abuse of privilege, attacks on churches, and desecration of graves,
monuments and any other symbol of the national identity of the Serbian people.
Organized Albanian terror produced an unbearable atmosphere of vulnerability
and fear and compelled growing numbers of Serbs and Montenegrins to leave.
Thus in [one] part of its own republic the Serbian people was [sic] reduced to the
status of a minority (but without minority rights), while its percentage in the
ethnic structure of Kosovo rapidly dwindled-from 27.4 percent in the 1948
population census to 14.9 percent in 1981, the greatest fall occurring between
1961 (still 27.4 percent) and 1981 (14.9 percent).
Dimitrije Bogdanovic, The Kosovo Question-Past and Present, in Kosovo 153 (Basil W.
R. Jenkins ed., 1992).
19. See id.
20. JULIE A. MERTUS, Kosovo: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR 293
(1999).
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number of Serbs and Montenegrins leaving Kosovo rose to 30,000
during the 1980s.21 In 1985, Kosovo Serbs took a petition signed
by 2,000 people to the Assemblies of Serbia and Yugoslavia.2 In
1986, 200 Belgrade intellectuals submitted a petition on Kosovo to
the Assemblies in Serbia and Yugoslavia in order to demand
immediate action from the authorities, seeking protection from
ethnic Albanians. 23 The Committee of Serbs and Montenegrins
also collected 50,000 signatures on another petition demanding
greater rights for Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo.24 Finally, in
1986, Slobodan Milosevic made his entrance as the newly
appointed leader of the League of Communists of Serbia.
25
After adopting a comfortable niche in Yugoslav politics by
advocating the rights of Kosovar Serbs, Milosevic loftily declared
that Serbs would no longer be harmed in Kosovo. 26 According to
David Fromkin, Milosevic proposed measures and constitutional
amendments that would revoke the autonomous status of
Vojvodina and Kosovo as Albanians increased their demands for
secession and central ethnic Albanian leaders were dismissed. 27
In 1989, Serbia's National Assembly passed amendments to
Serbia's Constitution that centralized Belgrade's control. 28
Additionally, the federal government imposed emergency
measures of curfews, riot police, administrative detentions in
Kosovo, and the deployment of a large numbers of federal troops
within Kosovo.2 9  Shortly after the arrest of some Albanian
political leaders, the Kosovo Assembly voted to accept the
constitutional amendments.
30
By 1990, a full-fledged state of emergency was declared as
demonstrations increased.31 Yugoslavia sent troops, tanks,
warplanes and an additional 2,000 police officers into Kosovo in
21. Id. at 294.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. DAVID FROMKIN, Kosovo CROSSING: AMERICAN IDEALS MEET REALIrY ON
THE BALKAN BATTLEFIELDS 154-55 (1999).
27. MERTUS, supra note 20, at 295.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 296.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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February, but removed them in April.32 Finally, the Serbian
legislature extended the emergency measures, and closed the
Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences.
33
In an act of defiance toward the Yugoslav authorities, the
Albanian members of the Assembly of Kosovo passed the
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, effectively establishing a
parallel government. 343 The Assembly of Serbia passed the new
Constitution of Serbia,35 depriving Vojvodina and Kosovo of their
autonomy, and elected Slobodan Milosevic President in 1990.36
By 1992, in elections later deemed illegal by the Serbian
authorities, Ibrahim Rugova was elected president of the Republic
of Kosovo.
37
As armed fighting ignited in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Western
attention focused on Bosnia, and little attention was directed to
Kosovo. 38 Yet the armed fighting in Bosnia was a direct result of
the growing nationalism from Kosovo and Croatia spreading to
various Muslim and Croat groups within Yugoslavia. 3' In 1995,
after extensive fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace
Accord was signed, but Kosovo was not included in the
agreement.
40
Even by 1996, there was no peace in the Kosovo region as the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a guerilla unit, emerged for the
first time.41 Kosovar Albanians began to grow restless due to the
alleged passivity of the militant ethnic Albanians and started to
question Rugova's strategies.42 This frustration over the lack of
advancement in the rights of Kosovar Albanians propelled
civilians to unite in forming the KLA to wage sporadic attacks on
the Yugoslav army.
43
32. Id. at 297.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. SERB. CONST. (adopted Sept. 28, 1990), available at
http://www.smip.sv.gov.yufacts/laws/const-sr-e.html (on file with author).
36. MERTUS, supra note 20, at 297.
37. Id. at 301
38. Id. at 304.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 306.
41. Id. at 307.
42. Id.
43. Id.
20011
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
2. Developments in Fighting
As violence increased, the conflict in Kosovo began to draw
substantial attention from the international community. 44  By
February 1998, KLA guerrilla operations were gradually
increasing. 45 The attacks, initially directed at the Serbian army,
went on to include civilians, including Serbian mail carriers and
others associated with Belgrade. 46 The guerrilla attacks ignited an
inflamed response from the Serbian military and police, who
brutally retaliated against civilians regarded as supporters of the
KLA.4
In February 1998, the United States sent Robert Gelbard as a
Special Envoy to the Balkans.48 Gelbard announced in Pristina
that without question, the United States regarded the KLA as a
terrorist group, and that the United States strongly condemned
terrorist activities in Kosovo. 49  Two weeks after this
announcement, the Serb forces waged a brutal attack on a small
town considered the headquarters of a KLA clan.50 The attack
killed almost 100 people and left only ruins behind.51 The KLA
reacted by occupying large areas of the province, leaving the Serbs
unable or unwilling to respond to this occupation.
52
In light of the increase in violence, and based on past
experience in the Balkans, the international community attempted
to solve the situation quickly. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1160 in March 1998, calling upon the FRY and the
Kosovar Albanians to work toward a political solution.53  In
addition, this resolution imposed a mandatory arms embargo on
both parties to the conflict., 4 The resolution avowed that failure
to make constructive progress toward the peaceful resolution of
44. See NOAM CHOMSKY, THE NEW MILiTARY HUMANISM: LESSONS FROM
Kosovo 31 (1999).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. S.C. Res 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160
(1998).
54. Id.
[Vol. 23:329
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the situation in Kosovo would lead to the consideration of
additional measures.
55
Despite the arms embargo, the situation continued to
deteriorate. During the summer of 1998, the Serb forces reacted
to the KLA occupation of large areas within Kosovo by burning
villages and driving out the residents. 56 At the same time, the
KLA had effectively taken control of forty percent of Kosovo, and
Milosevic responded with a major offensive.
57
In September 1998, the Security Council again acted by
adopting Resolution 1199, determining that the situation in
Kosovo had deteriorated and constituted "a threat to peace and
security in the region." 58  The Security Council demanded
concrete improvements, asking for a cessation of hostilities, a
cease-fire, and further action to alleviate the situation as well as
promote negotiation involvement by both parties.59 In addition,
the Council decided that "should the concrete measures
demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be
taken, to consider further action and additional measures to
maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."
60
Then it became clear that Russia would veto any Security
Council resolution, including an express authorization to use force
against the FRY.61 The United Nations was unable to sanction the
use of force within Resolution 1199, and this effectively blocked
further U.N. action to deploy any military force within the FRY.
62
In light of this paralysis, NATO decided to take over.
63
Members of the regional organization agreed to authorize
and participate in military operations if the FRY failed to comply
with the Security Council resolutions. 64 As the Alliance prepared
55. Id
56. Tim Judah, KLA Is Still a Force to Be Reckoned With, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1999,
at A22.
57. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 31.
58. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(1998).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, EURO. J.
INT'L L., at 2 Kosovo: A Thin Red Line, available at
http://www.ejil.org/journalVollONol/ab-2.html (last modified Apr. 26, 1999).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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itself for armed attacks, it publicly announced its impending
military operation as a "humanitarian intervention" closely linked
to the principles and legal basis of the U.N. Charter. 65 Secretary-
General Solana clearly enunciated the NATO objectives in a letter
addressed to the permanent representatives of NATO on October
9, 1998:
The relevant main points that have been raised in our discussion
yesterday and today are as follows:
The FRY has not yet complied with the urgent demands of the
International Community, despite UNSC Resolution 1160 of 31
March 1998 followed by UNSC 1199 of 23 September 1998,
both acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The very stringent report of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations pursuant to both resolutions warned inter alia
of the danger of an humanitarian disaster in Kosovo.
The continuation of a humanitarian catastrophe, because no
concrete measures towards a peaceful solution of the crisis have
been taken by the FRY.
The fact that another UNSC Resolution containing a clear
enforcement action with regard to Kosovo cannot be expected
in the foreseeable future.
The deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and its magnitude
constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the region as
explicitly referred to in the UNSC Resolution 1199.
On the basis of this discussion, I conclude that the Allies believe
that in the particular circumstances with respect to the present
crisis in Kosovo as described in UNSC Resolution 1199, there
are legitimate grounds for the Alliance to threaten and if
necessary, to use force.
66
In the course of the next few days following Solana's letter,
U.S. intelligence reported that the Kosovo rebels intended to draw
NATO into its fight for independence by provoking Serbian forces
into further atrocities. 67 At the same time, the situation seemed to
65. Id
66. Id
67. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 33. As described by Professor Chomsky, this may be
explained by the fact that deplorable human rights violations carried out by the Serbs
would result in considerable attention from the international community and the potential
[Vol. 23:329
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improve with the help of U.S. Special Envoy Richard
Holbrooke. 68  The deal reached between Holbrooke and
Milosevic included a cease-fire and two separate agreements.
69
The first agreement was entered into on October 16, 1998,
between the FRY and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This agreement authorized the
OSCE to establish a verification mission in Kosovo, and asked the
FRY to comply with Resolutions 1160 and 1199.70 The second
agreement was entered into on October 15, 1998, between the
FRY and NATO. The second agreement established an air
verification mission over Kosovo.7 1 The U.N. Security Council
approval of these diplomatic efforts was embodied in Resolution
1203,72 in which the Council, acting under Chapter VII, formally
endorsed the two agreements and demanded full and prompt
implementation of the agreements by the FRY.73 In addition, the
for the re-creation of a separate territory for the Kosovar Albanians with internationally
recognized borders. See id. If human rights violations were solved internally, the situation
for the Kosovar Serbs could be ameliorated but the old borders would retain their status
quo. See id. According to journalist/historian Tim Judah, the Kosovar Albanian
leadership never supported the Croat and Bosnian Muslims, as "'they did not want the
international community to uphold the principle that Yugoslavia's old republican borders
could turn into new inviolable international ones"' effectively retaining Kosovo as a
province "'trapped inside Serbia' instead of a Republic with a right of secession. Id. at
28. Moreover Kosovo Albanians abstained in the 1992 Yugoslav election, the LDK
denouncing any participants as traitors. Id. This refusal is of momentous importance.
According to Miranda Vickers:
the million Albanian votes would undoubtedly have ousted Milosevic, but as the
Kosovar leadership admitted at the time, they did not want him to go. Unless
Serbia continued to be labelled as profoundly evil-and they themselves, by
virtue of being anti-Serb, as the good guys-they were unlikely to achieve their
goals. It would have been a disaster for them if a peacemonger like [opposition
candidate Milan] Panic had restored human rights, since this would have left
them with nothing but a bare political agenda to change borders.
Id. This was even more clearly evident in 1992 through 1993 when Dobrica Cosic, the
Serbian President of Yugoslavia, "proposed 'discreet contacts with Kosovo Albanian
leaders' that the territory be partitioned, separating itself from Serbia apart from 'a
number of Serbian enclaves."' Id. The proposition was rejected by Albanian leaders. Id.
68. Id. at 33.
69. Simma, supra note 61.
70. Id; S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 53, at 1; S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 58, at 1.
71. Simma, supra note 61.
72. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3937th mtg. atl, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203
(1998).
73. Id. at 2.
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Council reiterated its stance that the Kosovo conflict constituted a
continuing threat to peace and security in the region.
74
In spite of these diplomatic efforts, the situation deteriorated
and the violence increased.7 5 On January 15, 1999, Serb forces
waged an attack on Racak, a village in Kosovo, killing forty-five
civilians.76 This event received extensive media coverage and may
have been the decisive factor that moved NATO to resume threats
of air strikes and initiate preparations for war.77  The threats
increased, and on February 1, 1999, the FRY representative
denounced NATO's actions in a letter. He demanded a meeting
of the Security Council "following the NATO threats to the
sovereignty of [his] country." 78  He further added that "[t]he
decision by NATO, as a regional agency, to have its Secretary-
General authorize air strikes against targets on the FRY territory
... represent[ed] an open and clear threat of aggression against
the FRY as a sovereign and independent Member State [sic] of the
United Nations. '79  The letter concluded that explicit U.N.
authorization would be necessary prior to a military strike against
the FRY.8 °
In an effort to provide a final diplomatic solution to the
conflict, Serbs and KLA members met in Rambouillet on
February 6, 1999, under the direction of the Alliance. 81 Although
74. Id.
75. Simma, supra note 61. Clashes between the rebels and the police were repeatedly
reported as both sides continued fighting regardless of the cease-fire agreements. Mike
O'Connor, Attack by Serbs Shatters a Cease-Fire in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at
Al. On December 24, 1998, Serbian forces waged a sustained assault on separatist
guerrillas as more than forty armored vehicles and tanks fought throughout the day. Id.
On December 27, 1998, "rebels came down from the hills... and attacked a large police
post ... between the Serbian capital of Belgrade and Pristina, the provincial capital."
Mike O'Connor, Rebels Attack Serb Police Post in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at
A16. The attack reportedly included the use of 120-millimiter mortars by the rebels as
well as heavy machine gun fire by the police. Id. Although both sides engaged in fighting,
it was mainly the rebels who ignited these violent clashes. Id. According to the French
Defense Minister Alain Richard, the "renewed fighting" is to be "blamed ... mainly on
ethnic Albanian guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army." France Talks of Possible
Pullout in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, at 9.Similarly, Richard Holbrooke stated that,
"[t]he main destabilizing factor today is the rebels, not the Serbs." Id.
76. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 33.
77. Id.
78. Simma, supra note 61.
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
81. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 106. The terms of the Rambouillet agreement can be
found at Rambouillet Accord-Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in
[Vol. 23:329
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the terms of the Rambouillet agreement were accepted by the
KLA delegates, they were rejected by Serbs. 82  Upon this
rejection, the threats of air strikes became a reality. 3 On March
19, 1999, the Kosovo Verification Army withdrew from the FRY
in preparation for bombings. 84 Finally, on March 23, 1999, NATO
began its air strikes directed at the territory of the FRY.85 These
actions were deemed legally justified as a humanitarian
intervention closely linked to Security Council Resolution 1199,
necessary to prevent further loss of civilian life in Kosovo by
Serbian military forces.
86
3. Goals Meant to Be Achieved by NATO and the United States
The decision to conduct air strikes on March 23, 1999, was
based on various humanitarian reasons illustrated in U.S.
President William Jefferson Clinton's article in the New York
Times entitled, "A Just and Necessary War."8 7  According to
Clinton, air strikes were meant to restore refugee Kosovars to
their homes (presumably by stopping further refugee flow and
providing safe conditions for the return of refugees); to expel Serb
forces out of Kosovo; to enable the deployment of an
international security force with NATO at its core; to reverse
ethnic cleansing; and to establish respect for minority rights within
Kosovo.
88
One of the most prominent motivations underlying the
"humanitarian intervention" by NATO forces was concern for the
refugees.8 9 According to NATO sources, in the year before the
bombing, several hundred thousand people had become internal
Kosovo, http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2000) [hereinafter
Rambouillet Accord].
82. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 108.
83. Id. at 109.
84. Id. at 17.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Simma, supra note 61.
87. William Jefferson Clinton, A Just and Necessary War, N.Y.TIMES, May 23, 1999,
at A17.
88. Id
89. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 16. As indicated by Professor Chomsky, however, an
examination of refugee data quickly demonstrates that the NATO intervention actually
caused an increase in the number of refugees. Id.
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refugees. 90 The situation differed for refugees living beyond the
borders of the FRY.91 According to the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), prior to the bombing and two days after
the first air strikes no data was reported on refugees. 92  After
three days of bombing, on March 27, 1999, the UNHCR reported
4,000 refugees from Kosovo in Albania and Macedonia. 93 By
April 5, 1999, approximately 350,000 had left Kosovo since the
beginning of air strikes.94  In addition, an unknown number of
Serbs had fled to Serbia to seek safety from violence.
95
Approximately half the Serb population has reportedly fled since
the NATO bombing began.
96
Varying estimates are available for the number of internally
displaced refugees within Kosovo.97  On March 11, 1999, the
UNHCR reported that more than 230,000 people were displaced
within Kosovo.98  According to Cambridge University Law
Professor, Marc Weller, the Legal Advisor to the Kosovar
Delegation at the 1999 Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, the
number of displaced refugees had "risen to over 200,000" after
March 19, 1999.99
All totaled, the final number of refugees is staggering. On
June 3, after the peace accord had been reached, the UNHCR
reported that there were 671,000 refugees beyond the borders of
the FRY (70,000 in Montenegro and 75,000 who fled to other
countries). 00  Additionally, the number of internally displaced
90. Id. Internal refugees are refugees displaced within the borders of Kosovo rather
than outside of the province's borders. Id. These figures are the result of Yugoslav police
actions and the victims are predominantly Albanian due to the high percentage of
Albanians within Kosovo. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Carlotta Gall, Misery and Disease Sweep Macedonian Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1999, at AT.
95. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 16.
96. Id at 17.
97. See id. at 16-17.
98. Id.; Gall, supra note 94, at A7; Guy Dinmore, Thousands Flee Kosovo's Cities as
Fear Spreads, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1999, at 1; Kevin Cullen, Wary Serbs Join Soldiers'
Retreat, BOSTON GLOBE, June 12 1999, at A9; United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), Ogata Says Situation Deteriorating in Kosovo, Urges Action to
Avert Disaster, Mar. 11, 1999 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review).
99. CHOMsKY, supra note 44, at 17.
100. Id.; see John Yemma, Daunting Task Ahead in Province, BOSTON GLOBE, June 6,
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refugees is estimated to be two to three hundred-thousand.1 °1
According to the Yugoslav Red Cross, over a million were
displaced within Serbia after the bombing.
10 2
Another humanitarian concern that presumably resulted in
NATO air strikes was the level of Serb atrocities committed in
Kosovo. 10 3 According to NATO, approximately 2,000 people had
been killed in Kosovo in the year before the bombing.10 4  This
number increased considerably after the onset of air strikes. 10 5
According to a U.S. State Department report issued in May 1999,
"reports of atrocities increased significantly" on March 24, 1999.106
Data as to the number of atrocities committed was obtained from
refugees and could not be precisely verified. 0 7 Nevertheless, it is
clear from the State Department report that atrocities sharply
increased from the onset of air strikes.
1°8
1999, at A30 (citing UNHCR refugee figures).
101. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 17.
102. Yugoslav Red Cross, Report on the Humanitarian Situation, available at
http://www.bhhrg.org/serbia/serbial999/humanitariansituation.htm (last modified Jan. 26,
2001).
103. See U.S. Dep't of State, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo (May 1999),
at http:l/www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnicksvotoc.html (last visited Nov.
6, 2000) [hereinafter Erasing History].
104. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 16.
105. Id. at 16-17.
106. Erasing History, supra note 103.
107. Id. At the time, all of the members of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)
had left the region and could not have been the source of the information. Id.
108. Id Although the air strikes were conducted in order to prevent the escalation in
the number of refugees and to prevent further atrocities, the increase in refugees and
atrocities committed appears to have been entirely predictable according to Commanding
General Wesley Clark and U.S. intelligence resources. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 20.
On March 27, General Clark announced that it was entirely predictable that Serb terror
and violence would intensify after the NATO bombing. Id. In addition, General Clark
stated that he was not surprised by the sharp escalation of Serb terror after the bombing:
"[t]he military authorities fully anticipated the vicious approach that Milosevic would
adopt, as well as the terrible efficiency with which he would carry it out." Id. at 21. House
Intelligence Committee Chair Porter Goss stated to the press that "[ojur intelligence
community warned us months and days before [the bombing] that we would have a virtual
explosion of refugees over the 250,000 that was expected as of last year [pre-bombing],
that the Serb resolve would increase, that the conflict would spread, and that there would
be ethnic cleansing." Id. Despite these assertions, on the same day as General Clark's
statement, U.S. State Department spokesperson James Rubin stated that "[t]he United
States is extremely alarmed by reports of an escalating pattern of Serbian attacks on
Kosovar Albanian civilians." Id. at 20-21. Finally, even in 1992, European monitors in
Macedonia predicted large amounts of Albanian refugees if a conflict reached Kosovo. Id.
at 21. The removal of the KVM had presumably, in light of Serb opposition to the
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By examining refugee data and through investigations of Serb
atrocities, it appears the onset of air strikes caused a dramatic
increase in both the refugee flow and atrocities committed.1 °9
III. THE BASIS AND MEANS OF THE INTERVENTION
In ascertaining the legitimacy of NATO's air strikes in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia, it is necessary to examine the
legal basis for the intervention as well as the legality of methods
used to achieve the desired military objectives.1' 0 Consequently,
an examination of the legitimacy of NATO's intervention must
entail two independent determinations: first, the circumstances
under which a regional organization may legitimately intervene
with the use of force 1 and second, the range of force that such an
intervention may apply in achieving military objectives. 112
A. The Legitimacy of NATO Intervention
International law recognizes limited circumstances for the use
military force. 113 As the terms of the U.N. Charter are a primary
source of international law, the Charter's provisions dictate
legitimate uses of force within the international arena.
114
withdrawal of the KVM a few days before the onset of air strikes, the same consequences
of increasing refugee flow and atrocities by Serb troops. Id. at 22.
109. As Professor Chomsky argues, the logical conclusion is that preparations for air
strikes and the onset of air strikes dramatically exacerbated the precise humanitarian
conditions that compelled NATO intervention. See CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 16-22.
110. Use of force is generally recognized under the U.N. Charter in self-defense
situations; it is also acceptable where the United Nations is acting to protect international
peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. See discussion infra Part H.A.1. In
the past ten years, however, the United Nations has intervened for humanitarian reasons
in purely internal conflicts thereby creating a new means of intervention under Chapter
VII. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
111. This will include an examination of the U.N. Charter as well as the humanitarian
intervention doctrine.
112. This range of legitimate uses of force is to be determined under Protocol I, supra
note 3.
113. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat.
1031; T.S. No. 993.
114. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
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Although a plain reading of the Charter provides for legitimate
use of force under limited circumstances, the Security Council has
previously condoned use of force for strictly humanitarian
interventions. 115 Whether such interventions may occur without
Security Council approval is questionable.
1. Use of Force Under the U.N. Charter
The U.N. Charter provides a central procedure applicable to
all member states through which decisions regarding military
interventions are to be determined.116 This centrality is clearly
evidenced in Article 103 of the Charter, which states that in the
event of a conflict between the Charter and any other
international agreement, the terms of the Charter are to prevail.117
According to the Charter, necessary force is to be used only
in the event of explicit Security Council authorization or for the
self-defense of a member state. 118  Article 2(4) of the Charter
states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
119
Two exceptions are available to this broad prohibition on use of
force: Article 51 and an enforcement action under Chapter VII.
120
Article 51 states that members have an "inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence [sic] if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations" even where there is no
Security Council authorization for the use of force.121 Chapter
VII grants the United Nations power to intervene militarily in the
affairs of another state only if two conditions are met: (1) the
determination of rules of law.
Id. Because the United Nations has reached almost global membership, and U.N.
recognitions and conventions are the first listed sources of international law, the terms of
the U.N. Charter are of primary importance in determining the legitimacy of international
action. See id.
115. Byron F. Burmester, Comment, On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World
Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269, 314-15 (1994).
116. U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 27; id. ch. VII.
117. Id. art. 103.
118. Id. arts. 2(4), 5; see also id ch. VII; Simma, supra note 61.
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
120. Id. art. 51.
121. Id.
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Security Council must determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and (2) the
Security Council must take all peaceful alternative steps to resolve
the dispute or determine that none will be adequate. 22 The
primacy of these provisions is emphasized in Article 53(1), which
states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council.91 23  Article 51 and Chapter VII
interventions are therefore applicable internationally, supersede
conflicting treaties, and articulate the only legitimate uses of forces
recognized under the U.N. Charter.
These exceptions, although explicitly permitted by the
Charter, should be interpreted in light of the Charter's emphasis
on minimizing violence in the international community.124  The
Preamble of the Charter states that the Charter is designated "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. ' ' r 5 Article
1 sets forth a preeminent purpose of the Charter "to bring about
by peaceful means... [the] settlement of international disputes...
which might lead to a breach of the peace."'126 Article 1 further
articulates that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
122. Id. arts. 39-51. In assessing the necessity of enforcement actions under Chapter
VII of the Charter, the Security Council must follow specific steps to issue an explicit
authorization for the use of force as evidenced by Articles 33, 41, and 42. Id. arts. 33, 41-
42. Article 42 states that the Security Council may authorize force only after determining
that non-lethal sanctions under Article 41 would be or are inadequate. Id. art. 42. In other
words, Article 42 sets forth the principle that force should be used as a last resort. Article
33 similarly states that parties to a dispute are to seek peaceful resolutions to conflicts. Id.
art. 33. Consequently, only after an examination as to the failure of non-lethal sanctions in
ameliorating a particular conflict, can the United Nations issue an authorization for the
use of military force under Article 42. Explicit authorization must come from the Security
Council addressing the necessity of intervention in light of the failure of peaceful
remedies. Id. art. 53. This principle is further emphasized in Article 53(1), which states
that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." Id. Although a clear intent is
necessary by the Security Council, it is not necessary to include the language "military
force" to constitute an explicit authorization; the language most commonly used is "all
necessary means." Id.
123. Id. art. 53.
124. Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires, and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 124, 128 (1999); Richard A. Falk, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 611,634 (1994).
125. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
126. Id. art. 1.
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of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression.' 27  This, however, must be read in conjunction with
the establishing principle "that the UN was founded to be
attentive first and foremost to peaceful settlement of international
disputes and to rely on the military instrument of policy only as an
extreme last resort., 128  This principle is further embodied in
Article 33, which states that the parties to any dispute must first
seek a resolution by peaceful means.129  Therefore, any
authorization of military intervention must be weighed against the
U.N. purpose of resolving conflicts peacefully and diplomatically.
The terms of the U.N. Charter have gained worldwide
acceptance and entered the realm of higher international law.
130
This is well recognized by member states as evidenced in Article
103 of the Charter. 131 An abandonment of the Charter principles
could result in competing claims to the right of intervention and
eventually lead to an escalation of violence. 132  Consequently, as
an embodiment of higher law, the text of the U.N. Charter
recognizes only two explicit situations warranting the use of
force.
13 3
2. Humanitarian Intervention
Although the Charter's text provides for forceful intervention
in enumerated instances, the Security Council has, in the past,
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at art. 33.
130. See Simma, supra note 61.
131. Id.
132. Id Questions arise as to the ability of the Security Council to act where it is
"paralyzed" by a veto. The Security Council's decisions are governed by Article 27(3),
which provides that its action requires "the concurring votes of the permanent members."
U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3). For an intervention to occur, all permanent members must
agree as to whether the intervention should take place. See id During the Cold War, the
Security Council was often paralyzed by vetoes where a particular action was to be
undertaken-this is no longer the case. In the past eight years, the Security Council has
authorized the use of force to address threats to peace and security. See discussion infra
Part II.A.2.b. The argument that a veto may paralyze the Council and call for intervention
by member states or regional organizations to address the problem without the sanction of
the Security Council is unwarranted. The fact that the Council's vetoes are still present is
an illustration of the Council's vitality in addressing issues rather than a stubborn
impediment in furtherance of preferred policies.
133. Simma, supra note 61.
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called for intervention for reasons falling beyond these explicit
instances.134  As grave human rights violations offending basic
notions of justice occur within a particular state, the international
community finds itself faced with the decision of whether to
intervene in order to alleviate the prevalent human suffering
inflicted upon an often innocent population. While a
humanitarian intervention may provide relief to distressing
conditions, it may also provide an opportunity for self-interested
parties to intervene under the guise of an allegedly humanitarian
and benevolent gesture. 135 For these reasons, international law
and the international community have often recognized and
supported humanitarian interventions that are authorized by the
Security Council.136  While interventions lacking such
authorizations may have found some recognition, it is clear they
are to be undertaken under a narrow set of circumstances in order
to protect against the self-interest of the intervening states.
137
a. Pre-Charter Custom
Humanitarian intervention is the doctrine of using force
against one state in favor of the citizens of that state without the
consent of its government. 138 Most scholars appear to agree that
the humanitarian intervention justification for the use of force was
first recognized by Hugo Grotius during the course of the
seventeenth century. 139  Grotius argued that a nation may
justifiably rely on the use of such force because the intervening
state's bond with the mistreated citizens and their common
humanity supersede the relationship between sovereigns.
140
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See id
137. Commentators have advocated the legitimacy of forceful intervention without
Security Council authorization for humanitarian reasons under enumerated circumstances.
These circumstances are discussed in greater detail infra, but mainly include: (1) the
existence of gross human rights violations; (2) paralysis of the Security Council; (3)
exhaustion of diplomatic means; and (4) proportionality in the use of force.
138. See 1OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 442 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
139. Burmester, supra note 115 at 272; Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the
U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203,209 n.17.
140. Burmester, supra note 115, at 272-73.
[Vol. 23:329
Protocol I and Operation Allied Force
During the nineteenth century, with the rise of the nation
state, the doctrine fell into disfayor due to the prevalent emphasis
on each nation's right to sovereignty. 141 With the formation of the
United Nations and the drafting of the U.N. Charter, the doctrine
appeared to have been entirely discarded in light of Articles 2(4)
and 2(7) of the Charter prohibiting the unilateral use of force with
the exception of self-defense.
142
b. Humanitarian Intervention Authorized by the Security Council
The Charter's drafters placed great emphasis on international
peace and security, principles of sovereignty, and prohibitions on
the use of force.I 4 3  Nevertheless, the use of force for
humanitarian interventions, when endorsed by the Security
Council to remedy serious human rights violations, has found
widespread recognition throughout the international
community. 4 4 The doctrine relies on the text of the Charter,
principles of morality, and past history, as well as practice
subsequent to the Charter's enactment.
145
The Preamble of the Charter reads that the people of the
United Nations "reaffirm [their] faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person ... ."146 In
addition, the Preamble states that armed forces should not be used
"save in the common interest," an interest which would certainly
include "faith in fundamental human rights."'147 The Preamble
further underscores the Charter's emphasis on respect for human
rights and states the United Nations' goal "to establish conditions
under which justice ... can be maintained.' 48  Therefore,
considerations of fundamental human rights are essential to
141. Id. at 273; Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 396 (1993).
142. Burmester, supra note 115, at 274.
143. For general background information, see Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective
Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323 (1996); Jost Delbrilck, A Fresh Look
at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887
(1992); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J.
INT'LL. 117 (1991).
144. See generally Tes6n, supra note 143, at 340.
145. Id.
146. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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interpreting the Charter. This conclusion is supported by Article
31(2) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties, which states that
preambles are to be considered in interpreting the meaning of
treaties.
149
An examination of history serves as a further guide in
interpreting the extent to which the United Nations was destined
to protect fundamental human rights. The organization was
formed as a result of the devastating effects of war and its
accompanying human rights violations.15° In addition, an analysis
of subsequent humanitarian interventions, particularly in the post
Cold War Era, determines the scope and circumstances eliciting
Security Council intervention.151 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties recognized and incorporated the international
principle that when interpreting a treaty, one should take into
account subsequent practice. 152  Consequently, the interventions
in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Iraq provide guidance as to the extent
and scope of a U.N. intervention. 153  These notions of morality,
history, practice, and a plain reading of the Charter's text furnish a
firm basis for the recognition of humanitarian interventions under
the U.N. Charter.
154
149. BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-04 (1991).
150. Tes6n, supra note 143, at 342. The drafters' intent was to prevent the
reoccurrence of the two cataclysms that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century;
this intent is evidenced in one of the first four purposes and principles of the United
Nations that places emphasis on the maintenance of international peace and security.
Burmester, supra note 115, at 274.
151. Tes6n, supra note 143, at 340.
152. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(b)(3), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
153. Tes6n, supra note 143, at 340.
154. Although gross human rights violations resulting in Security Council intervention
often result in threats to international peace and security, questions arise as to the Security
Council's authority to act in situations where the human rights violations are of a purely
domestic nature. Id.; ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLrTICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 76 (1963). Chapter VII
grants the United Nations the power to militarily intervene in the affairs of another state
only if the Security Council determines the existence of "any threat to the peace, breach of
peace, or act of aggression," and the Security Council has taken all peaceful steps to
resolve the dispute and none of these alternative steps have proven successful. U.N.
CHARTER ch. VII. Under Article 39, such threat to the peace or act of aggression must
disturb international peace and security before the Council may act under Articles 41 and
42. Id. art. 39. In addition, Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state-in other words, a state's
sovereignty. Id. art. 2(4). The legitimacy of intervention in a purely domestic human
rights violation situation is based on reasons of political philosophy as illustrated by
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The Security Council is the ultimate decision-maker with
regard to humanitarian interventions. It must determine whether
the human rights violation at issue causes a threat to international
peace and security, or whether it should remain a purely domestic
issue.
c. Humanitarian Intervention Lacking Security Council
Authorization
The use of force in humanitarian interventions without
explicit Security Council approval has led to considerable debate
over whether such interventions violate international law.
155
Situations may arise where the Security Council is unable to react
to certain human rights violations due to disagreement between
permanent members or because of financial difficulties. The
Charter's emphasis on the protection of human rights by
individual member states, and the works of various commentators
expounding the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention without
the Security Council's approval lend support to the notion that
such interventions are legitimate under enumerated
circumstances. 156 Nevertheless, in order to determine the strength
of the doctrine, the Charter and the works of these commentators
must be interpreted in light of the prevalent state practice.
i. The Charter's Inherent Tensions
It is undeniable that the Charter contains inherent tensions
between the principle of promoting human rights and the notion
of maintaining peace and security.157  Article 2(4) prohibits the
Professor Tes6n, who argues that the purpose of a state is to protect the human rights of its
citizens. Tes6n, supra note 143, at 342. A state derives its legitimacy and sovereignty
from popular consent and the subsequent protection of human rights. Id. Therefore,
governments "forfeit their legitimacy in the international arena when they turn against
their citizens and betray the ethical end that justifies their existence." Id In addition, as
stated by Professor Tes6n, the human rights issue is no longer a matter of exclusive
domestic jurisdiction. Id. The U.N. General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions
regarding human rights, some directly applicable to particular states. Id. Consequently,
even in the event of purely domestic human rights violations, the Security Council retains
jurisdiction to address the matter because humanitarian intervention will not infringe upon
a state's sovereignty. Id.
155. See Burmester, supra note 115, at 269.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 300. Although promoting human rights may ultimately achieve peace and
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use of force against "the territorial integrity or political
independence" of a state.158 Article 55, on the other hand, states
that the United Nations shall promote "universal respect ... for
human rights." 159 In addition, Article 56 calls on member states to
"take joint and separate action ... for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55.,,160 If the United Nations is
unable to act when serious human rights violations are occurring,
some scholars argue that sufficient basis exists for the use of force
even without Security Council authorization. 161  A state
committing gross human rights violations forfeits the benefit it
derives as a sovereign under Article 2(4).162 Thus, the promotion
of human rights prevails and a state may intervene under Article
56 without violating the ban on use of force contained in Article
2(4) 163
ii. Commentators
Some commentators agree with the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention, emphasizing the importance of striking
a balance between the need to prevent human rights violations
and the danger of interventions for non-humanitarian motives.
164
Several commentators have even advanced various rules to justify
humanitarian intervention lacking Security Council approval.
Professor W. D. Verwey posited an inherent right of humanitarian
intervention under particular conditions.165 Emergency situations,
such as where right to life violations are occurring on a massive
scale, would be an example. 166  All peaceful efforts must have
security, states are nevertheless forbidden under Article 2(4) from infringing upon a
state's sovereignty. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). Article 2(4) is meant to maintain peace and
security by prohibiting attacking forces from infringing upon a state's sovereignty. See id.
The inherent tension arises from the need to maintain peace and security through
preservation of a state's sovereignty and member states' obligations to promote human
rights. Burmester, supra note 115, at 300.
158. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
159. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
160. Burmester, supra note 115, at 299-300.
161. See infra Part III.A.2.
162. Burmester, supra note 115, at 300.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See W. D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 32
NETH. INT'L L. REv. 357, 418 (1985); Captain Davis Brown, The Role of Regional
Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F. L. REv. 235,272 (1997).
166. Verwey, supra note 165, at 400.
[Vol. 23:329
Protocol I and Operation Allied Force
been exhausted, and an intervention must be the last resort to
save the lives of potential victims. 167 The intervening state must
be disinterested, the United Nations must be unable to act, and
the force used must be proportional to the objective.
168
Professor Ved Nanda similarly enumerated five criteria for
humanitarian interventions: (1) there must be a necessity for
intervention, such as in the case of genocide or gross violations of
human rights; (2) the force used must be proportional to the
objective, the duration and force applied must not exceed the level
required for achievement of the objective; (3) the intervention
must be motivated by humanitarian conditions; (4) whether the
action was collective or unilateral; and (5) whether the
intervention maximized the best outcome.
169
Another commentator who endorses humanitarian
intervention is Judge Antonio Cassese of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 170 He set out strict
conditions when the use of armed forces may be justified absent
Security Council authorization. 171 According to Judge Cassese,
the following conditions must be present: (1) there must be gross
and egregious violations of human rights "involving loss of life of
hundreds or thousands of innocent people, and amounting to
crimes against humanity, ... carried out on the territory of the
sovereign state ... [;]" (2) these crimes result from anarchy in a
sovereign state or result from the acts of the authorities; (3) the
Security Council is unable to act because of disagreement between
permanent members; (4) all peaceful means have been exhausted;
(5) a group of states, as opposed to one state, decides to halt the
atrocities; and (6)
armed force is exclusively used for the limited purpose of
stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights
... the use of force must be discontinued as soon as this purpose
167. Id.
168. Id. at 418.
169. Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-
Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law (Part I), 20
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 310 (1992).
170. Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimization of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?,
EuRo. J. INT'L L., available at http://www.ejil.org/journafVollOINol/com.html (last
modified May 11, 1999).
171. Id.
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is attained ... force should be commensurate with and
proportionate to the human rights exigencies on the ground...
military action would not be warranted in the case of a crisis
which is slowly unfolding and which still presents avenues for
diplomatic resolution aside from armed confrontation.
17 2
In examining these theories, the similarities between the
conditions calling for humanitarian intervention are clear. These
commentators are attempting to evade legitimizing excessive use
of force as well as interventions for non-humanitarian purposes.
Nevertheless, the particular motives underlying an intervention
are often difficult or even impossible to ascertain. Therefore, it
becomes crucial to narrow the scope of permissible interventions
to situations dealing with egregious human rights violations and to
legitimize use of force only for the limited purpose of stopping
human rights violations and improving the victims' living
conditions. Moreover, in order to maximize the most positive
outcome in a particular conflict, it becomes crucial to exhaust all
possible avenues for diplomatic negotiations before resorting to
force. 173 Consequently, where an intervention is undertaken for
humanitarian purposes by a state or a group of states, these
factors would impact the legitimacy of the particular intervention.
iii. Customary Law
The justification and theories advancing the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention without Security Council approval must
be judged in light of current practice. 174  History is certainly
replete with examples of humanitarian interventions; a brief
examination of state practice, however, evidences a revival of U.N.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Customary law is an essential element in determining international law as stated
in Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it shall apply: a. international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law,
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031; T.S.
No. 993.
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involvement in humanitarian interventions since the end of the
Cold War.
During the Cold War, prevailing political disagreements and
the distrust between East and West resulted in frequent inaction
or paralysis within the Security Council.175 Conflicts, such as in
Pakistan and Uganda, calling for immediate Security Council
action, were often neglected by a lethargic and inactive United
Nations. 176  In 1971, the Pakistan army descended upon the
civilian population in East Pakistan. 177 Between one and three
million civilians were killed, while a million others fled to
neighboring India.178 When Pakistan launched a preemptive air
strike against India, India invaded both East and West Pakistan.
179
The war ended ten days later when Pakistan surrendered. 8 °
Throughout the entire episode, the United Nations remained
silent and impotent. 181 The Security Council failed to respond to
India's attack because the Soviet Union vetoed resolutions calling
for a cease-fire.
182
Similar inaction occurred in the Ugandan-Tanzanian
conflict. 183  From 1971 to 1979, during the reign of Idi Amin,
approximately 300,000 people were executed.184 Some claim that
Amin's regime parallels Hilter's Germany and Stalin's Russia.
185
In 1978, Ugandan forces attacked Tanzania. 186 Amin annexed the
territory after causing complete destruction of the land. 87 About
40,000 Tanzanians became refugees and between 5,000 and 10,000
175. Brown, supra note 165, at 236.
176. Burmester, supra note 115, at 286.
177. Id.
178. Id
179. Id.
180. Although the attack on Pakistan was claimed to be an act of self-defense, a
Commission of Inquiry into Events concluded that if India had based its invasion on the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, its actions would have been justified. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 287.
183. Id. at 290.
184. Id. at 289.
185. Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan
Conflict "Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 859, 867-81
(1981).
186. Id. at 869.
187. Id. at 870.
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were missing or feared dead. 88 After two months of occupation,
Tanzanians, supported by Ugandan insurgents, fought back
causing the collapse of the Ugandan army and capturing the
Ugandan capital of Kampala. 189 During Amin's rule of Uganda,
the United Nations never addressed the matter,190 nor did the
United Nations respond to the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda.
191
The events in Pakistan and Uganda clearly illustrated the
United Nations' inability to react during the Cold War when
egregious human rights violations were being committed. 92 This
risk of inaction, in light of the paralysis of permanent members,
strengthened the need for legitimizing humanitarian intervention
by states to put an end to gross human rights violations even
without explicit Security Council authorization.
Following the end of the Cold War, the Security Council
experienced a newfound spirit of cooperation. 193  As East-West
tensions dissipated, new humanitarian operations were created in
Iraq, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Rwanda.
194
Although these operations were sometimes not as successful and
efficient as initially envisioned, a precedent for the Security
Council's involvement in humanitarian interventions has
undeniably been established.195
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council
mandated that member states "use all necessary means ... to
restore international peace and security[,]" effectively drawing
forces from several countries to enforce the resolution.196  This
188. Id. at 872.
189. Burmester, supra note 115, at 290.
190. See Uganda: The Human Rights Situation; Assessment of the Current Political,
Economic, and Religious Policies; and Recommendations for U.S. Policies Before the
Subcomm. on Foreign Econ. Policy of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 113 (1978) (statement of Hon. Edward Mezvinsky, U.S. Representative to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission). Mr. Mezvinsky noted that the Human Rights Commission
excluded action toward Uganda; explained that a U.K. resolution that would have
addressed situation was defeated; and stated that "[tlhe UN is glacier-like, it is slow, it is
frustrating." Id.; see also Burmester, supra note 115, at 290.
191. Burmester, supra note 115, at 290.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Nanda, supra note 169, at 306.
195. Id. Professor Nanda argues that although the Security Council is more active now
in addressing humanitarian interventions than during the Cold War, it is still unsuccessful
in resolving these conflicts. Id. at 334.
196. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., (1991).
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was the first time after the Cold War that the Security Council
evidenced such a united front.
197
With this newly discovered spirit of cooperation, the Security
Council turned its attention to the situation in Somalia. 198  In
1991, due to widespread discontent at Siad Barre's government, a
civil war erupted in Somalia, which eventually led to a
governmental collapse. 199  The presence of gangs became
prevalent throughout the country, and a severe drought caused
the deaths of approximately 300,000 people. 20  The United
Nations' involvement included the enactment of various
resolutions that eventually led to the Council's explicit
authorization for humanitarian intervention. 21 Resolution 794
stated that the conflict in Somalia constituted a threat to
international peace and security, and recommended action under
Chapter VII in order to establish a more secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.20 2
The Security Council's involvement was also illustrated in the
conflict between Serbs and Bosnians in a series of resolutions.
Resolution 757, adopted on May 30, 1992, imposed trade sanctions
on the FRY for supporting aggression.20 3 Resolution 787, adopted
in November 1992, called upon states, acting unilaterally or
through regional organizations, to enforce the embargoes.
20 4
Resolution 781, adopted a month earlier, called upon states to
help the peacekeepers enforce the ban on military flights in
197. Nanda, supra note 169, at 333.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Keith B. Richburg, Aideed: Warlord in a Famished Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 8
1992, at Al; Robert G. Patman, The UN Operation in Somalia, in A CRISIS OF
EXPECrATIONS: UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 85 (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A.
Thayer eds., 1995).
201. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg. (1992) (stating that the
situation in Somalia has become a threat to international peace and security; imposing a
complete arms embargo; and calling for increased humanitarian aid); S.C. Res. 746, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3060th mtg. (1992) (sending a technical team to observe the
administration of humanitarian aid and establishing a peace agreement between the
warring parties); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. (1992) (establishing a
security force in Somalia); S.C. Res 775,. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3110th mtg. (1992)
(authorizing an airlift of humanitarian aid).
202. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. (1992).
203. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. (1992).
204. S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg. (1992).
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Bosnian air space.20 5  Resolution 816, adopted in March 1993,
called on states to take "all necessary measures" to enforce the no
fly zone, extending to all aircraft.20 6 The Security Council adopted
several resolutions establishing safe areas and authorized air
power in Resolution 836 to assist the peacekeeping force in
guarding such safe areas.20 7  Finally, after the Bosnian Peace
Agreement, the Security Council authorized its member states,
under Resolution 1031, to establish a multinational
implementation force (IFOR) and to take "all necessary measures
... in defense of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its
mission."
20 8
Active participation by the Security Council likewise
occurred in the Haitian conflict. 20 9 When newly-elected President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted from office in September 1991,
widespread human rights abuses began to take place.210 Amnesty
International reported that over 3,000 Haitians were murdered,
raped, arrested, and tortured.211 The unbearable conditions
caused a massive flight of Haitian citizens towards the United
States.212  The Security Council reacted with Resolution 940,
authorizing the use of "all necessary means" by a multinational
coalition to restore the Aristide government in Haiti.213
Finally, humanitarian concerns prompted the Security
Council intervention in Rwanda for humanitarian reasons.
214
During the summer of 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000
Rwandans died tragically in a genocidal campaign led by the Hutu
dominated Presidential Guard against Tutsis and Hutu opposition
members. 215  Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council
205. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122d mtg. (1992).
206. S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg. (1993).
207. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. (1993).
208. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3604th mtg. (1995).
209. Id.
210. Nanda, supra note 169, at 305-06; see also Margaret Daly Hayes & Gary F.
Wheatley, INTERAGENCY AND POLmCAL-MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF PEACE
OPERATIONS: HAITI-A CASE STUDY 10 (1996).
211. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL; HAITI: THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY, HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE THE Coup 7 (Jan. 1992) (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review).
212. Id. at 6.
213. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. (1994).
214. S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. para. 10 (1994).
215. See Tes6n, supra note 143, at 362-63.
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imposed an arms embargo upon Rwanda.216  Eventually,
Resolution 929 authorized France to use "all necessary means" to
achieve humanitarian objectives in Rwanda.
217
The extent to which the Security Council decided to turn its
attention to humanitarian crises throughout the world
demonstrates the United Nations' post Cold War focus in
addressing humanitarian conflicts. Questions may arise as to the
United Nations' effectiveness in dealing with such conflicts. Such
considerations, however, should not undermine the basis of the
Security Council's primary jurisdiction over humanitarian
conflicts, but rather encourage the financing and support of the
United Nations to find the most effective solution to be applied to
a particular humanitarian crisis.
iv. Strength of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine Without
Security Council Approval
Although the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention stands
on tenuous grounds, its remaining vitality applies to situations
where truly egregious violations of human rights occur and the
Security Council is absolutely unable or unwilling to act.218 This
paralysis results from the exercise of veto powers by permanent
Security Council members or from the Security Council's financial
inability to support an intervention. 219 It is clear that under such
circumstances the tactics employed by intervening states would
come under great scrutiny. 22  In analyzing the legitimacy of the
intervention, two separate examinations would be necessary.
First, the conditions of the humanitarian conflict would need to
demonstrate adequate basis for the intervention. 221  These
conditions must include gross human rights violations, exhaustion
of diplomatic efforts, and paralysis of the Security Council.2 22 The
second determination would be to decide whether the force used
216. See id.
217. S.C. Res. 929, supra note 214.
218. Cassese, supra note 170; see also Burmnester, supra note 115, at 272.
219. Id. at 271-72.
220. Id. at 272.
221. Cassese, supra note 170.
222. S.C. Res. 929, supra note 214.
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by the intervening forces was proportional to the harm sought to
be prevented.223
The doctrine of proportionality is an element of the laws of
war and is defined within Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of
1949.224 Any conclusions as to the legitimacy of force used,
whether for humanitarian purposes or otherwise, would therefore
require respect for the principles included within the Protocol.225
A legitimate intervention under this standard must include
egregious human rights violations, the exhaustion of peaceful
alternatives, and the paralysis of the Security Council in
addressing the matter.226 The force used must be proportional to
the limited objective of ending the atrocities and improving the
prevalent conditions. 227  Interventions falling outside of this
standard would not only establish a risky precedent for
subsequent competing allegations of the right to intervention, but
would also have the potential to jeopardize the safety of citizens
receiving the "beneficial" intervention through an escalation of
violence.
228
B. Proportionality
The second pertinent legal issue-the range of force that
intervening forces may apply in achieving military objectives-
must be judged in light of the doctrine of proportionality.229 The
doctrine of proportionality is an essential component of any
armed conflict, particularly in the case of aerial bombardments. 230
Proportionality requires military forces to balance the expected
civilian injury and damage with the military advantages of the
operation prior to an attack. 231 Although essentially embodied
within customary law since the Middle Ages,232 it was not until
223. Id.
224. Protocol I, supra note 3.
225. Id.
226. Id.
229. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 308 (1975). This
was part of the "Just War" theory. See also ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN
ATITrUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-
EVALUATION 14 (1960); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE
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1977 that the doctrine was finally incorporated as a treaty in
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.
233
1. Foundations of the Doctrine
The Christian theory of the Just War evidenced some of the
founding principles of the proportionality doctrine.234 It was not
until the emergence of modern methods of warfare, however, that
the doctrine of proportionality gained primary importance in the
protection of civilians.235 The Christian theory of the Just War
emphasized the justness of the cause of war rather than
proportionality.236 The justness of the cause largely determined
the extent to which resort to war could be limited.
237
Consequently, where one party to a conflict determined that the
cause was just, any methods of warfare were permissible to
achieve war objectives. 238 It was not until the secular law of the
Middle Ages, and some of the works of later canonists, that
notions of proportionality and civilian immunity became
discernible.
239
Writers, such as Grotius and Vattel, played a key role in the
development of the Just War theories of the Middle Ages.
240
They formulated urely secular theories including the principle of
proportionality. 24  Their stories involved a belligerent's response
to a grievance. 242 Grotius recommended that a ruler balance the
good and the evil that may result from a just war when making
decisions related to war.243 According to Grotius, resort to force
must only occur where the resulting consequences would lead to
more good than evil, although a ruler should also consider the
RESMRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY xxiii (1981).
233. See Protocol I, supra note 3.
234. Gardam, supra note 141, at 394; see also BAINTON, supra note 232, at 15.
238. Gardarn, supra note 141, at 394.
236. Id. at 395.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
242. Id at 394-95.
241. Id. at 396.
242. Id.at 395. Specifically, Grotius "developed the theory of the equal application of
the jus ad bell irrespective of the justice of a party's resort to force." Id. at 396.
243. See HUGO GROTIUS, DEJUREBELLUACPACLS LIBRi TRES, bk. H, ch. XX1V, pts.
V-VI (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1964) (1646).
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effectiveness of the means to achieve the good.244 Grotius is
credited with having developed a theory advocating the balancing
of military goals and the cost in terms of lives.
245
While the nineteenth century brought the development of
nation states, it also brought the dissolution of the Just War theory
and the emergence of war as a mechanism for implementing
national policy.246  This period also saw the development of a
principle balancing between military goals and the humanitarian
cost as a completely separate body of rules from the justness of
war or a belligerent's response to a grievance. 247 It is from the
development of the nation state to the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 that the modern law of armed conflict
developed.24 8 The notion that a belligerent does not have the
unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy began
to emerge and became the foundation of the modern doctrine of
proportionality. 249 This notion is related to another principle of
the law of armed conflict, which states "[tihat the only legitimate
object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is
to weaken the military forces of the enemy." 250 This principle was
first found in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and supports
the notion that weapons causing unnecessary suffering are
prohibited .251
As methods of warfare reached higher levels of
sophistication, concerns about the safety and protection of citizens
emerged, and proportionality became a focal point of the laws of
armed conflict. 52 The notion that a belligerent's right to use force
is limited had the effect of continuing the prohibition on the use of
244. Id.
245. Gardam, supra note 141, at 396; see also G.I.A.D. Draper, The Development of
International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW 67 (1988); Geoffrey Best, The Place Of Grotius in the Development of International
Humanitarian Law, in GROTIUS ET L'ORDRE JURiDIQUE INTERNATIONAL 101, 105
(1985).
246. See Gardam, supra note 141, at 396.
247. See id.; Draper, supra note 245, at 67.
248. See Draper, supra note 245, at 67.
249. See Gardam, supra note 141, at 397.
250. Id.
251. See Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 [hereinafter St.
Petersburg Declaration].
252. See Gardam, supra note 141, at 397.
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specific means of warfare.253 It further restricted the use of non-
prohibited means of warfare to the extent that the means were
deemed proportional to the achievement of a military objective.
254
As the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the
emergence of aerial bombardment, the protection of non-
combatants became of considerable importance. 255 Even though
the Hague Convention advocated the prohibition on bombing
undefended places and imposed the duty to warn inhabitants of
places of imminent bombardment, the issue of civilian protection
remained unaddressed.256 Although the First World War caused
agitation in the international community regarding the issue of
civilian protection, the Second World War made it imperative for
the issue to be addressed.257 Finally, in 1977, the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
completed the drafting of two additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions.2 58 Protocol I, addressing the protection of civilians
in international conflicts, and Protocol II, addressing the
protection of civilians in non-international conflicts, were adopted
by consensus by the international community.
259
Several principles predate the development of the doctrine of
proportionality and pervade any analysis of proportionality.
Proportionality is the concept of balancing the need to achieve
military objectives and protecting human rights principles.260 An
analysis of proportionality therefore begins with the recognition of
particular principles as a basis for weighing the extent and means
of the attack. The most important concepts that underlie the law
253. See id.
254. See id. at 399.
255. See id.
256. See The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
257. See Gardam, supra note 141, at 401; CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 550-51 (4th ed. 1965); see also Lester Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant
and Noncombatant in the Law of War, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 (1945).
258. Protocol I, supra note 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter
Protocol II].
259. See id.
260. See Lieutenant Colonel William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and
Protocol Iin Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REv. 91, 94 (1982).
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of armed conflicts are military necessity, humanity, and
chivalry.261 Military necessity is the concept of a belligerent's right
to use any means of force in order to achieve the purpose of the
conflict. 262  According to military necessity, a belligerent is
permitted to use any kind of force in order to achieve military
objectives in the least amount of time possible and with the least
amount of resources and lives lost.263 Humanity provides for the
prohibition of destruction and suffering not actually necessary for
the attainment of military objectives. 2-4 Finally, the concept of
chivalry, although retaining limited vitality in modern laws of war,
advocates the recognition of formalities and courtesies in war.
265
This concept is illustrated in the prohibition against the misuse of
enemy uniforms or flags of truce.
266
In examining these principles, the doctrine of proportionality
includes them in performing a balancing function between the
competing needs advocated. 67  In short, force may not cause
injury to noncombatants or cause damage to civilian objects if the
force used is disproportionate to the military advantage of the
operation.268 This notion is the basis for Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions.
2. International Treaties and Rules Prior to the Adoption of
Protocol I
Although Protocol I was the first international treaty
embodying the doctrine of proportionality, other documents
predating Protocol I address some of the underlying principles of
the doctrine.
269
Proportionality was implicitly recognized in Article 15 of the
Lieber Instructions, a document that is most likely one of the first
attempts at codifying the rules of war.270 The doctrine asserts that
261. See id at 93.
262. See id.
263. Seeid
264. Seeid
265. See id. at 94.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 95.
270. The Lieber Instructions were rules for the Union Forces during the American
Civil War in 1863. See id.; THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 6 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 2d ed. 1981).
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military necessity permits human suffering and death of the
enemy, but permits such a fate for other persons only if it is
incidentally unavoidable.27 1 Another document that includes
provisions to minimize civilian harm is the St. Petersburg
Declaration of 1868, which states "that the only legitimate object
which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to
weaken the military forces of the enemy.
'272
Following the First World War, a commission of jurists at the
Hague drafted a set of Rules of Air Warfare. 273 Although the
rules were never formally adopted by the international
community, they illustrate the jurists' response to the experience
of aerial bombardments. 274  These rules state that "[t]he
bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings not
in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces
is prohibited." 275 The rules also ban indiscriminate bombings by
stating that if the objectives are military objectives, and "they
cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of
the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from
bombardment. '"276 In addition, the rules include an element of
proportionality by stating that
[i]n the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land
forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings is legitimate provided there exists a reasonable
presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently
important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the
danger thus caused to the civilian population.
277
Although they addressed civilian protection, the Rules of Air
Warfare were never formally adopted and consequently there is
scarcely any explicit mention of the concept of proportionality
prior to the advent of WWII.
278
It is clear from the events of WWII that very little attention
to proportionality was given in light of the military tactics. The
271. Fenrick, supra note 260, at 95.
272. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 251.
273. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 270, at 150.
274. Fenrick, supra note 260, at 95.
275. THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLIcr, supra note 270, at 150.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Fenrick, supra note 260, at 96.
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sheer scope of civilian damage and numbers of injuries were so
extensive, however, that the international community began to
pay heed to the establishment of laws of war addressing civilian
protection. 27 9  In 1956, the International Conference of the Red
Cross adopted a set of Draft Rules for the Limitation of the
Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War.
280
These rules required military forces to assess whether an attack
would be disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated,
and imposed the requirement that no excessive damage result to
the surrounding areas of the point of attack.281 Although the rules
were largely ignored by the international community, they formed
the basis of Protocol 1. 82
International treaties or rules squarely addressing
proportionality were not widely recognized by the international
community.283  Although proportionality was not explicitly
included in these treaties or any other international agreements
prior to the enactment of Protocol I, the doctrine of
proportionality has always been regarded as an essential element
of customary law that seeks to strike a balance between military
objectives and protection of human rights.284
3. Protocol I
Civilian protection under Protocol 1285 of the Geneva
Conventions is addressed under Part IV of the Protocol, which in
279. See id. at 97.
280. See id.
281. Seeid
282. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLIcr, supra note 270, at 187-93.
283. See id
284. See Fenrick, supra note 260, at 93.
285. The states that have ratifications, accessions and successions to Protocol I are as
follows:
(1) Ratifications: Australia; Austria; Belarus; Belgium; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Canada;
Chile; Cote d'Ivoire; Cyprus; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Finland; Germany;
Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Holy See; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Jordan;
Republic of Korea; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Madagascar;
Mongolia; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Norway; Panama; Peru; Poland;
Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; San Mario; Senegal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland;
Togo; Tunisia; Ukraine; United Kingdom; Vietnam; Yemen; Yugoslavia; (2) Accessions:
Albania; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Bahamas; Bahrain;
Bangladesh; Barbados; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam;
Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; China;
Columbia; Comoros; Congo; Democratic Republic of Congo; Costa Rica; Cuba; Djibouti;
Dominica; Dominican Republic; Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia;
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turn is divided into separate Chapters individually addressing
various aspects of civilian protection.286 Of particular importance
are: Chapter I, stating the basic rule of civilian protection and
defining various terms used throughout the text; Chapter II,
setting out the basic parameters of protection of the civilian
population; Chapter III, providing for the protection of civilian
objects; and Chapter IV, determining the precautionary measures
that parties are obligated to undertake in order to spare the
civilian population from attack.287
Some of the primary principles and definitions underlying
Protocol I are stated within Chapter 1.288 A basic notion of the
laws of armed conflict, which had already been implicitly
enunciated in the St. Petersburg Declaration, is included in Article
48.289 It states that "[in order to ensure respect for and
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives." 290 Article 49 provides
that the Protocol applies "to any land, air or sea warfare which
may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian
objects on land" and that "[a]ttacks means acts of violence against
the adversary, whether in offence or defence." 291 Consequently,
the protection of civilians under the Protocol applies equally to a
Georgia; Grenada; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Jamaica; Kenya; Dem. People's Rep.
Of Korea; Kuwait; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Malawi;
Maldives; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Micronesia; Republic of Moldova;
Mozambique; Namibia; Nigeria; Oman; Palau; Paraguay; Qatar; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and
Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent Grenadines; Samoa; Sao Tome and Principle; Saudi
Arabia; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Suriname; Swaziland;
Syrian Arab Republic; Tanzania; Uganda; United Arab Emirates; Uruguay; Uzbekistan;
Vanuatu; Venezuela; Zambia; Zimbabwe; (3) Successions: Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatia;
Czech Republic; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Macedonia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Tajikistan;
Turkmenistan.
286. See Protocol I, supra note 3, pt. IV.
287. See id chs. II-IV.
288. See id. arts. 1-2.
289. See id art. 48.
290. Id.
291. Id. art. 49.
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military force acting in defense of an attack or acting strategically
to weaken the military forces of its opponent.
292
Chapter II determines the extent of the civilian population's
protection and delineates the permissible scope of military
attacks.293  According to Article 50, the presence of military
personnel within the civilian population does not deprive the
civilian population protection as civilians.294 The fundamental
principle of civilian protection is set out in Article 51, which states
that "[tlhe civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy
general protection against dangers arising from military
operations" and "[t]he civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack., 295 Article 51
also defines the limits of permissible military attacks by stating
that "[i]ndiscriminate attacks are prohibited." 296 Indiscriminate
attacks are:
(a) [t]hose which are not directed at a specific military
objective; (b) [t]hose which employ a method or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective;" or (c) [t]hose which employ a method or means of
combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by
this Protocol; and consequently in each such case, are of a
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction.
297
In other words, if an attack is unlikely to be limited to military
objectives and the means of the attack are likely to lead to the
targeting of civilians and non-civilians alike, whether voluntarily
or involuntarily, then the attack is considered impermissible.
298
In addition, Article 51 provides two examples of attacks that
are considered indiscriminate:
(a) [an attack by bombardment by any methods or means
which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly
separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town,
village or other area containing a similar concentration of
civilians or civilian objects; and (b) [a]n attack which may be
292. See id
293. See id ch. II.
294. See id. art. 50.
295. Id. art. 51.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.,
299
The second example illustrates the doctrine of proportionality.
300
These examples provide illustrations of indiscriminate attacks and
require military forces to assess whether an attack would cause
excessive damage to civilian lives and/or objects in comparison to
the objectives sought by the military. This weighing procedure
may not be satisfied by the mere subjective assessment of the
military, but rather by an objective standard in light of the overall
goal of the military's involvement in the conflict. 30 1 Chapter II
therefore limits military necessity by the requirement of an
objective assessment of proportionality.30 2
Chapter III addresses the protection of civilian objects and
may be crucial in protecting civilians in the post-conflict period.30 3
Article 52 opens the chapter by stating general rules regarding the
protection of civilian objects: "[clivilian objects shall not be the
object of attack or of reprisals. '' 30  Article 52 further emphasizes
the importance of identifying military objectives by stating:
[a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far
as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.
305
In other words, Article 52 imposes three requirements: (1) the
objectives must be military; (2) such objects must make an
effective contribution to the opposing party; (3) and the attack
must provide a definite military advantage in light of the
circumstances as they seemed at the time of the attack.30 6 In
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id arts. 50-51.
303. Id arts. 52-56.
304. Id art. 52.
305. Id. art. 52.
306. Id
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addition, this definite advantage may not be viewed in isolation of
the total goal of the military intervention.
The third paragraph of Article 52 provides an important
protection for civilian objects that may possess dual purposes. "In
case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so
used. 307  This paragraph imposes a subjective standard on
attacking forces and prohibits any attacks on civilian objects where
the military is not certain that the object is being used for an
"effective contribution" to the opponent's military action.30 8 Even
if the military does determine that the object provides an
"effective contribution" to the opponent's military action, the
military is still prohibited from attacking unless it finds that its
"destruction, capture or neutralization" will 9ffer "a definite
military advantage."
30 9
Article 54 addresses important considerations regarding
objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population. 310 The second paragraph states:
[iut is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or renderuseless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
... for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party,
whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to
cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
311
Examples are given of indispensable objects such as "foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works
.... , In other words, even if such military objectives are used
as sustenance for the adverse party, they may not be attacked to
deny the adverse party sustenance if such objects also serve as
sustenance to the civilian population. 313 In addition, the attack is
still prohibited even if the military did not have any motives of
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. art. 54.
311. Id
312. Id
313. Id.
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starving out the civilians or causing them to move away.314 There
is an exception to this prohibition where the objects are used "as
sustenance solely for the members" of the opponent's armed
forces or if the objects are not used as sustenance but "in direct
support of military actions." 315 Under no circumstances, however,
may such objects come under attack if it "may be expected to
leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water
as to cause its starvation or force its movement."316 The attacking
party would therefore bear the burden of showing that the objects
were being used solely for the use of the adverse party.
317
Alternatively, if the objects were not used for sustenance by the
adverse party, the attacking party would have to show that they
were used in direct support of the military action. 318 The attack
would, however, remain prohibited if it would result in inadequate
food and water supply to the civilian population.
319
The importance of preserving the natural environment is
embodied in Article 55, which states:
[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.
This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to
cause such damage to the nature environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population.
320
Article 55 discourages the military's selection of chemical plants
containing poisonous elements as targets, and could diminish the
use of warfare tactics that pose threats to the civilian population
via chemicals.
321
Finally, Article 57 delineates a procedure through which
those responsible for the attack are to assess the legitimacy of the
attack.322  It is incumbent upon such individuals to "[d]o
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. art. 55.
321. Id.
322. Id. art. 57.
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neither civilians nor civilian objects ... ;,,323 to "[take all feasible
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack. .. 324
to minimize "injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
325
and to "[r]efrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage
anticipated. 326  Any attacks are subject to cancellation or
suspension if these requirements are not satisfied.327 In addition,
if a choice exists between several military objectives, the objective
to be selected is the one with the least amount of potential danger
to civilian lives and objects.328 Article 57 basically summarizes the
principal points of Protocol I and reiterates the doctrine of
proportionality as previously mentioned in Article 51 by placing
the responsibility of proportionality upon those planning or
deciding the strategy for the attack.32 9
4. Proportionality and State Practice
A brief and chronological overview of state practice during
the past decade illustrates the scope of force employed by military
troops for purposes of humanitarian interventions or Chapter VII
enforcement actions. Although considerable military strength was
utilized during the Gulf War, subsequent interventions evidence a
significant reluctance to resort to force. 330 An assessment of the
doctrine of proportionality, therefore, leads to an examination of
the extent of reluctance or eagerness exhibited by states for the
commitment and use of armed forces.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait drew an impressive response from
the international community.331 In riposte to the Iraqi production
of force, the United Nations adopted Resolution 678, mandating
that member states "use all necessary means ... to restore
international peace and security in the area., 332 The resolution
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See Burnester, supra note 115, at 269.
331. See Nanda, supra note 169, at 330-31.
332. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 196.
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led to a cooperative marshaling of forces by member states in
order to conduct extensive air strikes upon the territories of Iraq
and Kuwait.333 The choice in targets was mainly dictated by two
considerations: diminishing the strength of Saddam Hussein's
military and demoralizing the Iraqi troops.334  Throughout the
conflict, air strikes were directed mainly at military equipment
such as ground weapons, aircraft, helicopters, ground forces,
tanks, and artillery sites.335  Other targets included four of
Baghdad's twelve bridges, several gasoline stations and two
ministries. 336 Some of the air raids resulted in extensive damage
to Baghdad's sewer systems, causing potential health hazards.
Iraqi officials reported numerous civilian deaths and extensive
damage to various mosques.
338
Although the air strikes struck mostly military targets, the
targets included a giant bunker containing hundreds of civilians
who were killed as a result of the attack.33 9 Other civilian targets
included a manufacturing plant that Western visitors have claimed
only fabricated infant formulas. 340 According to news reports, out
of the ninety-seven direct hits conducted in the region, twenty-
eight were in civilian areas.341  The force used resulted in
extensive damage to Iraq's military forces 342 and eventually led to
the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
343
333. Nanda, supra note 169, at 333.
334. R. W. Apple, Jr., Elite Iraqi Forces Hurt by Bombings, Allied Aides Insist, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at Al; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Officials Link Iraqi Offer to Rising
Losses in the Field, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1991, at Al.
335. Apple, supra note 334, at A17.
336. Two Government Ministries Hit in Raids on Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991,
at A14; Iraqi Lifts Estimate of Civilian Loss to Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1991, at
A13.
337. Two Government Ministries Hit in Raids on Baghdad, supra note 336, at A14.
338. Iraqi Lifts Estimate of Civilian Loss to Thousands, supra note 336, at A13.
339. Damage Control-and Real Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991, at A26.
340. Id
341. Two Government Ministries Hit in Raids on Baghdad, supra note 336, at A13.
342. Id. Although the aims of the operations may have been accomplished, some
commentators question the validity of the attacks under Protocol I while others discuss the
illegitimacy of the attacks under international environmental standards. Gardam, supra
note 141, at 391-92. It is clear that the conflict resulted in a disturbing precedent for
civilian protection, the strength of which can only be ascertained in light of subsequent
military interventions. Id.
343. Gardam, supra note 141, at 391-92.
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The end of the Gulf War brought the Somali conflict to the
forefront of international focus.344 The overthrow of Siad Barre's
brutal and repressive government 345 left the country in a bitter
civil war between various rebel groups, most of them under
General Mohammed Farah Aideed.346 As more than 1,500 people
were found slain in Mogadishu, 347 the country began to descend
into anarchy while starvation and disease began to raise the death
toll in some cities to an average of 300 per day.3 48  The United
Nations exhibited grave concern for the deteriorating situation
through the adoption of a general and complete arms embargo
and the establishment of peacekeeping operations. 349 Because the
violence did not abate, the United Nations, acting under its
Chapter VII powers, authorized use of "all necessary means to
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief.
' 350
The United States intervened by sending 2,000 marines for
the purpose of protecting food and medical supply deliveries.
351
Acting beyond their respective duties, the marines attempted to
arrange negotiations between the warring groups and began
disarming the clans. 352 The situation gradually deteriorated and
rebel troops began to fight against the intervening forces by
ambushing U.N. peacekeeping units, killing Pakistani
peacekeepers, and wounding U.S. soldiers. 353 In response to the
increase in violence, the United Nations seized the rebel leader's
headquarters and conducted air strikes against the leader's arms
344. This is evidenced by attention received by the press and the United Nations'
adoption of a general and complete arms embargo and the establishment of peacekeeping
operations pursuant to S.C. Res. 733, supra note 201, and S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3110th mtg. (1992).
345. Neil Henry, Evacuees Tell of Somalia's Chaos, Carnage, WASH. POST, Jan 7,
1991, at A17, A20.
346. Burmester, supra note 115, at 314.
347. Henry, supra note 345, at A17.
348. Keith B. Richburg, Diseases Sweep Somalis, Kill More Than Famine, WASH.
POST, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al, A46.
349. S.C. Res. 733, supra note 201; S.C. Res. 775, supra note 344.
350. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 202.
351. Burmester, supra note 115, at 315.
352. Id. at 316.
353. Keith B. Richburg, U.N. Troops Battle Somalis; Dozens Killed in Fierce Fighting;
Aideed's Arrest Ordered, WASH. POST, June 18, 1993, at Al; Keith B. Richburg, Aid
Staffs Pull Out of Mogadishu, WASH. POST, June 7, 1993, at Al.
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depots and radio stations for three days.354 When the air strikes
failed to abate the fighting and snipers began directing their
attacks upon U.N. troops, the U.N. troops fought back with the
help of machine guns from U.S. Cobra helicopters. 355 The United
States gradually began to question the utility of U.S. troops in the
region and eventually announced that it would leave Somalia
within a period of six months.356 By January 1995, all troops had
left, including U.N. peacekeepers.
357
Another conflict that brought extensive international
involvement was the conflict between Bosnians and Serbs in the
former republic of Yugoslavia. Air strikes conducted by NATO
were a direct result of a U.N. mandate for the protection of safe
areas.358  Having already provided for the establishment of
peacekeeping operations under the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR),359 the Security Council adopted additional
resolutions creating U.N. safe areas "free from armed attacks and
from other hostile act[s]., ' 360  The resolution empowered
UNPROFOR to protect the safe areas and to remove Serbian
military forces using force. 361 In addition, the Security Council
authorized air strikes to assist UNPROFOR and to protect the
safe areas.362  The resulting air strikes by NATO were a close
collaboration between NATO and the United Nations.
363
Aircrafts took military action against Serbian fighter-bombers,
artillery command posts, Serbian military vehicles, ground troops,
missile sites, and tanks.364 The meticulousness of the choice in
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Burmester, supra note 115, at 317.
357. Id.
358. Roger Cohen, NATO Shatters Old Limits in the Name of Preventing Evil, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1998, at 3.
359. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg. (1992).
360. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg. (1993).
361. Id.
362. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 207.
363. The United Nations' input on the air strikes was so strong that Bob Dole, in the
ABC News program, This Week, stated: "[Tihe UN ought to get off of NATO's back, and
let NATO take care of the Serbian aggression in Bosnia." Michael R. Gordon, NATO Set
to Bomb Serbs in Croatia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at Al.
364. Id, Roger Cohen, NATO, Expanding Bosnia Role, Strikes a Serbian Base in
Croatia, N.Y. TIEs, Nov. 22, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Cohen, NATO Expanding Bosnia
Role]; Roger Cohen, NATO Jets Hit Missiles as Serbs Gain in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
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targets was exemplified in an attack upon a Serbian controlled air
base.365  The target was important because air raids had been
conducted from this air base against safe areas.366  Although
NATO and the United Nations had chosen to conduct air strikes
-against the air base, the strikes only destroyed the runway, leaving
the planes intact.367 In August 1995, NATO began an intensified
bombardment of Serb targets by focusing on areas around
Sarajevo, a region crippled with extensive fighting.368 In addition,
the warplanes targeted air defense radar and communication sites,
ammunition depots, and command posts throughout Bosnia.
369
Ground fighting included British, French, and Dutch artillery near
Sarajevo.370 As NATO strikes intensified, firepower shifted to air
defense networks in northwest Bosnia while attacks were waged
on bridges, ammunition dumps, and command posts in the
southeast.
371
A final instance of a conflict entailing the use of force for
humanitarian purposes is the conflict in Rwanda between the
Hutus and the Tutsis.372  The genocidal campaign led by the
Presidential Guard of the Hutu-led government against Tutsis and
Hutu opposition members resulted in the death of approximately
500,000 to 800,000 people and eventually led to the Security
Council's authorization for France to use "all necessary means" to
achieve humanitarian objectives in Rwanda. 373  Operation
Turquoise, as France named it, was meant to be a humanitarian
intervention to save lives.374  Although the Security Council
authorized the use of force, the French troops used none,
concentrating only on saving the lives of refugees and maintaining
the peaceful nature of the operation until their departure.
375
24, 1994, at Al; Eric Schmitt, NATO Shifts Focus of Its Air Attacks on Bosnian Serbs,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at Al.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Cohen, NATO Expanding Bosnia Role, supra note 364, at Al.
368. Roger Cohen, NATO Presses Bosnia Bombing, Vowing to Make Sarajevo Safe,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug., 31, 1995, at Al.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Schmitt, supra note 364, at Al.
372. Id.
373. Cohen, supra note 368, at Al.
374. Charles Bremner, France Prepares Pullout After Hailing Rebel Victory, TIMES
(London), July 20, 1994, at 10.
375. Id.; Sam Kiley, Paris Tells Troops To Woo Rebels In Rwanda, TIMES (London),
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5. Strength of Proportionality
To determine state practice with regard to proportionality, an
examination must be made of the extent of force used throughout
these military interventions. Attention must be given to the
selection of military targets, the amount of force exerted, and the
extent of civilian damage and injury resulting from the conflict.
Although the doctrine of proportionality addresses civilian
protection, the use of force inevitably entails damage or injury to
the civilian population. 376 It is therefore important to recognize
that civilian harm will not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the doctrine of proportionality is violated.37 7 Rather, it is
disproportionate civilian harm in comparison to military
advantages that results in violation of the doctrine of
proportionality.
378
The Persian Gulf conflict air strikes may have established a
balancing standard, with an emphasis on the attainment of military
objectives, at the cost of civilian harm. The authorization for the
use of force was a Security Council resolution representing a
Chapter VII enforcement action.379  Although unintended,
considerable civilian harm resulted from Operation Desert Storm,
which left the legitimacy of the attack under Protocol I highly
questionable 380
This precedent must, however, be interpreted in light of
subsequent conflicts. The Somali conflict involved exigent
circumstances calling for immediate international reaction.381 The
authorization for use of force similarly emanated from a Security
Council resolution to restore sufficiently peaceful conditions for
the establishment of humanitarian relief operations. 38 2 Despite
the requirement for intervention, the force used by U.N.
peacekeepers and the United States was only apparent when the
intervening forces fell under attack.383 Although such forces were
June 25, 1994, at 12.
376. Gardam, supra note 141, at 398.
377. Id. at 400.
378. Id. at 404-05.
379. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 196.
380. Gardam, supra note 141, at 405.
381. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 202.
382. Id.
383. See Tes6n, supra note 143, at 350.
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certainly meant to establish humanitarian conditions, they were
first and foremost a reaction to direct attacks. The Somali conflict
therefore illustrated the international community's reluctance to
resort to force even where explicitly permitted by Security Council
mandate under Chapter VII.
384
While the attacks on Yugoslavia were of an even greater
scope than in Somalia, the international community was also
reluctant to use force. Authorization for the use of force came
from direct Security Council approval for the enforcement of
resolutions establishing safe areas. 385  A tight relationship
between the United Nations and NATO led to careful selection of
targets and resulted in frequent U.N. denial for directing air
strikes on particular targets. 386 Although the air strikes resulted in
some civilian harm and injury, the firepower was limited to strictly
military targets within the Bosnian region where most of the
conflict was contained.387 The Yugoslavian conflict, therefore,
illustrates an additional instance where the international
community and the United Nations cooperation resulted in
carefully selected bombardments in order to prevent excessive
violence.
The Rwandan conflict further illustrates the international
community's misgivings about the commitment of force. The
genocidal campaign and extreme violence certainly called for
international attention. 388  It would be difficult to say that the
Iraqi conflict exhibited more exigent circumstances than the
horrific fighting that was occurring in Rwanda.389  The
international community, however, did not respond with air
strikes.390  Alarmed at the fighting, the Security Council
authorized the use of force to restore humanitarian conditions.
391
The resulting intervention was the French "Operation Turquoise"
which remained entirely pacific and humanitarian.
392
384. S.C. Res. 929, supra note 214, para. 10.
385. Id.
386. Gordon, supra note 363, at Al.
387. See Schmitt, supra note 364, at Al.
388. Kiley, supra note 375, at 12.
389. For additional information on the fighting in Rwanda, see Tes6n, supra note 143,
at 362-63.
390. See S.C. Res. 929, supra note 214.
391. Id.
392. Kiley, supra note 375, at 12.
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Although the Gulf War evidenced considerable use of force,
subsequent interventions, with full authorization for the use of
force, indicate a preference for a restrained and selective
application of firepower.393 Thus, state practice appears to value
the doctrine of proportionality by demonstrating a willingness to
use force to the extent of ameliorating the prevalent situation
while minimizing collateral damage and protecting the civilian
population from further harm.
IV. THE Kosovo CRISIS
The legitimacy of Operation Allied Force must be examined
under two distinct perspectives: whether NATO legitimately could
intervene in the FRY and whether such intervention was
undertaken by a legitimate use of force. Although these two
issues are inherently connected by the notion of
proportionality,394 two separate analyses will be undertaken, as
each issue raises independent violations of international law.
A. The Lawfulness of NATO's Humanitarian Intervention
In light of the Security Council's lack of authorization for the
use of force and NATO's subsequent humanitarian intervention in
Kosovo, an examination of the intervention's legality is warranted.
Operation Allied Force must consequently be judged according to
a legal standard legitimizing humanitarian interventions lacking
Security Council support. As previously discussed, such a
criterion would include an examination of several considerations,
namely: (1) the magnitude of human rights violations (reaching
genocidal proportions or the death of thousands); (2) the
exhaustion of diplomatic remedies; (3) a paralysis of the Security
Council; and (4) a conformity to rules of proportionality by the
intervening forces.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 376-91.
394. Humanitarian interventions lacking Security Counsel authorization are legitimate
where: (1) egregious human rights violations are occurred on a large scale; (2) there is a
paralysis of the Security Council; (3) diplomatic avenues have been exhausted; and (4) the
intervention abides by the notion of proportionality. A finding of these four factors will
legitimize such an intervention; where the fourth factor is violated, however, it will result
in illegitimate humanitarian intervention and constitute a violation of Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. Protocol I, supra note 3.
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1. Serbian Atrocities
NATO's humanitarian intervention in Serbia was based on
the need to prevent the progression of Serb tactics implementing
genocidal polices. 395 Consequently, the prevalent warring climate
prior to NATO's intervention must be examined because it
formed the basis for NATO's humanitarian intervention. It is
therefore necessary to focus on the human rights violations that
occurred prior to March 24, 1999, in order to fully determine
whether the situation had degenerated to such an extent as to
exhibit qualities of mass human rights violations. While this
examination leads to the conclusion that an alarming number of
human rights violations were in fact committed, the methods and
tactics utilized by the Serb military and paramilitary forces failed
to exhibit an implementation of "ethnic cleansing" or "genocidal"
policies. 396 Nevertheless, the fact that genocidal polices were not
implemented does not negate the considerable brutality apparent
in both warring parties' assaults and that the conflict's severity was
sufficient to warrant appropriate action by the international
community.
397
As previously discussed, the conflict between Serbs and
ethnic Albanians originally arose from widespread discontent as to
the political and economic status of Kosovar Albanians in the
Yugoslav society.398  While Kosovar Albanians had shown
considerable anti-governmental reactions through the enactment
of a parallel government and the election of an independent
president (both deemed illegal by the Yugoslav government),
399
the KLA emerged from prevalent frustrations regarding the
inefficiency of non-violent means.400 While the KLA may appear
395. See Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Human Rights
Developments, http://www.hrw.org/hrw/wr2k/Eca-26.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2000).
396. The conflict emerged as a Civil War between guerrilla factions and Yugoslav
authorities rather than a coordinated plan for the eradication and expulsion of the Kosovar
Albanian population as a whole. See Michel Chossudovsky, NATO's War of Aggression
Against Yugoslavia: An Overview, at
http://www.jacksonprogressive.com/issues/kosovo/chossudovskynato.btml (last visited Nov.
9, 2000).
397. See id
398. The original conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbs arose due to their
discontent as Kosovars within Serbia; the Kosovo Civil War, however, emerged due to the
clash between Serb forces and the KLA. See id.
399. MERTUs, supra note 20, at 297-301.
400. Non-violent means were advocated by Rugova and supporters who established the
[Vol. 23:329
Protocol I and Operation Allied Force
to symbolize the political views of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo,
this fails to take into account the large number of ethnic Albanians
who prefer non-violent methods as a means to social change
within Kosovo. 401 The conflict consequently ignited because of
the differences between the ideologies of a radical guerrilla group,
advocating principles often not recognized by ethnic Albanians,
and the Serb authorities' intent on eliminating an organization it
considered to be of a terrorist nature.
40 2
The events that induced the onset of air strikes largely
occurred between 1998 and 1999.403 The early months of 1998
brought increased attention from the international community as
the intensity in fighting between the KLA and the Serb military
appeared to escalate. 40 4 The Serb military offensive in early 1998
was a direct result of regular and sustained assaults by KLA
guerrilla forces on authorities.40 5 Although the KLA carried out
its first attack in 1993, it was not until the middle of 1997 that the
assaults increased in regularity and effectiveness. 40 6 In the few
months preceding March 1998, the rebel forces took over more
than a dozen police stations, and appropriated an abundant array
of automatic weapons.40 7 They had also attacked numerous police
patrols and checkpoints and claimed responsibility for "the
assassinations of more than [fifty] Serbian policemen and officials,
as well as of ethnic Albanians suspected of collaborating with the
Serbian authorities.
'" 40 8
In response to these attacks, the Serbian government
gathered police and paramilitary units from the Ministry of the
Interior to organize a counterinsurgency campaign against the
rebel forces.40 9- The disposition of Serbs in Kosovo changed to
parallel government. Id. at 307. The KLA emerged due to discontent with the alleged
inefficiency of Rugova's non-violent means of seeking independence for Kosovo. Id.
401. Chris Hedges, In New Balkan Tinderbox, Ethnic Albanians Rebel Against Serbs,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Hedges, Tinderbox]; Chris Hedges, Ravaged
Kosovo Village Tells of a Nightmare of Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at A3
[hereinafter Hedges, Nightmare].
402. Hedges, Nightmare, supra note 401, at A3.
403. Id.
404. See supra Part I.A.2.
405. See Chossudovsky, supra note 396.
406. Hedges, Tinderbox, supra note 401, at A8.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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face the increased threats of rebel assaults.410 Chris Hedges of the
New York Times vividly depicted the prevalent conditions:
Many Serbs have begun to send their families out of the region.
The postal authorities have halted services to [thirty-three]
towns where the rebels operate. Serbian enclaves and towns
have set up barricades with armed guards at night. Police
checkpoints are now placed behind sandbags and protected by
snipers on the roofs of nearby buildings. Nearly all police
officers carry assault rifles and wear bulletproof vests.
411
In the next few weeks, hundreds of Serbian police and
paramilitary units began a sweep in central Kosovo in search of
ethnic Albanian rebels operating in the area.412  Surrounding
rebel enclaves, the police embarked in violent combat against
rebel forces, often causing the deaths of innocent civilians caught
in the line of fire. 413 Those who fled stated that police were firing
indiscriminately, while those unable to escape were found dead,
often bearing signs of torture and mutilation.414 The intensity of
the conflict augmented throughout the following months as larger
numbers of Serb forces continued their habitual tactic of encircling
rebel enclaves and firing at rebel forces.415 By October 1998, with
the help of Holbrooke, the parties reached an agreement for a
cease-fire and the violence abated.416  Despite the cease-fire,
however, the conflict renewed soon thereafter.417 By the end of
1998, an estimated 2,000 ethnic Albanians had been killed.418
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Chris Hedges, Serbs Claim Victory over a Separatist Militia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1998, at A6. As with most terrorist groups, the KLA is solely based on civilian recruits.
Hedges, Tinderbox, supra note 401, at Al. It draws its strength by using various villages
as bases and relies on guerrilla attacks to further its cause for independence. Id.; Hedges,
Nightmare, supra note 401, at A3.
413. Chris Hedges, Serbs Renew Crackdown on Albanian Villages in Kosovo, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at A3.
414. Id. Although at some of these sights, ethnic Albanian leaders asserted that the
people were unarmed, numerous shell casings on the floors of the houses were found
where these unarmed people had been stationed leading to the conclusion that they were,
in fact, armed. Chris Hedges, Nightmare, supra note 401, at A3.
415. See id.
416. Chris Hedges, New Serb Assault on Albania Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1998, at
Al.
417. Id.
418. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 16; Human Rights Watch, supra note 395. Amnesty
International's figures amount to "more than 1,500." Amnesty International, Annual
Report 1999, 365 (1999). Not an extraordinary number since the conflict had been waged
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While these tactical methods certainly engendered the deaths
of numerous civilians, it is doubtful that the Serbs intended to
eliminate the Kosovar Albanian population as a whole through
genocide or ethnic cleansing.419  The 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines the term
"genocide." 420 Article II states:
[i]n the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
[k]illing members of the group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) [d]eliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) [i]mposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; ej
[f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
"Generally speaking, genocide does not mean the immediate
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings
of all members of a nation." While Article II of the Convention
appears quite ambiguous, Raphel Lemkin, the scholar who coined
the term "genocide," provides further insight on its meaning.
According to Lemkin, genocide "is a hybrid consisting of the
Greek genos meaning race, nation or tribe; and the Latin suffix
-cide meaning killing. The realities of European life in the years
1933-45, Lemkin said, called for the formulation of a legal concept
of destruction of human groups."
423
Genocide is intended to signify a coordinated plan of
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations
of the life of national groups, with the goal of annihilating the
groups themselves.424 The objectives of such a plan tend to be
disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture,
since 1993. James Bissett, The Tragic Blunder in Kosovo, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Jan. 10,
2000.
419. See Bissett, supra note 418.
420. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
421. Lori Lyman Bruun, Comment, Beyond the 1948 Convention-Emerging
Principles of Genocide in Customary International Law, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 193,
197 (1993).
422. Id. at 196-97.
423. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 108 (1972).
424. LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 9 (1985).
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language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security,
liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals
belonging to such groups.425 Genocide is directed against national
groups as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the
national group.
426
Genocide, or ethnic cleansing, therefore represents a
coordinated plan to destroy members of a particular group
through the intentional implementation of a policy necessitating
the eradication of the group as an "entity.",4 27  The events in
Kosovo prior to the commencement of air strikes fail to exhibit
such qualities. Although the conflict between Serbs and the KLA
guerrilla forces certainly resulted in brutal human rights violations,
the conflict seems to have been waged by the Serb forces in order
to cease guerrilla attacks, eliminate rebel forces, and retain
Kosovo as a province within Serbia.428 The prevailing policies of
the Serbs prior to NATO's intervention did not include a
systematic destruction of Kosovar Albanian culture, religion,
language, or even economic existence. 429 Rather, the Serb forces
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Serb forces, enraged by the KLA guerrilla operations, reacted by waging
numerous attacks on villages it considered basis of KLA operations. Hedges, supra note
413, at A3. The resulting victims of these attacks included KLA members, its alleged
supporters, and a large number of civilians residing in the rebel enclaves. Id. These
attacks were often situated in the Drenica region of Kosovo, one of the KLA's
strongholds, as well as near the border of Albania because KLA recruits often crossed
borders to join the ranks of rebel forces. Id. One may conclude that the flow of refugees
that resulted from the assaults may similarly not be labeled as "ethnic cleansing" as it is
doubtful that the displacement of civilians would fail to occur in any civil war where
combating forces are fiercely resorting to the use of shelling, snipers, and mortars. See id.
429. Certainly this view is not shared by members of the Alliance: "We must act to
save thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian catastrophe-
from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal dictatorship. . ." British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, House of Commons debate (Mar. 23, 1999). "It's time for action,
time to make a decision. And I hope it's done very quickly. Otherwise, [Milosevic's]
going to amass more troops and you're going to have another massacre. What we have in
Kosovo and what [we] had in Bosnia was genocide, and that's why I think we should
intervene." U.S. Senator Bob Dole, Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 21,
1999) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative
Law Review). U.S. President Bill Clinton stated:
What we are trying to do is to limit [Milosevic's] ability to win a military victory
and engage in ethnic cleansing and slaughter innocent people and to do
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concentrated on waging a civil war by eradicating the KLA
guerrilla forces from Kosovo.430 The international community's
lack of knowledge prior to the onset of air strikes as to the Serb
policies is surprising in light of an official intelligence report of the
German Foreign Ministry which confirmed that no "ethnic
cleansing" was occurring within Kosovo.431 The report stated:
Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked to
Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of Kosovo is still
not involved in armed conflict. Public life in cities like Pristina,
Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc. has, in the entire conflict period,
continued on a relatively normal basis. The actions of the
security forces [were] not directed against the Kosovo-
Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against the
military opponent [KLA] and its actual or alleged supporters
.... [W]ith an agreement made with the Serbian leadership at
the end of 1998 ... both the security situation and the
conditions of life of the Albanian-derived population have
noticeably improved .... Specifically in the larger cities public
life has since returned to relative normality.
432
The magnitude of violence within Kosovo was similarly
documented in an independent assessment of the Kosovo
conflict.433 Roland Keith, an office director of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission who left Kosovo on March 20, 1999, reported
that most of the violence in Kosovo was instigated by the KLA:
434
Upon my arrival the war increasingly evolved into a mid
intensity conflict as ambushes, the encroachment of critical
lines of communication and the [KLA] kidnapping of security
everything we can to induce him to take this peace agreement, which is the only
way in the wide world over the long run he's going to be able to keep Kosovo as
an independent part of this country-or an autonomous part of this country.
Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 495 (Mar. 23, 1999). "[The
rounding up of Kosovar Albanians] suggests that an ethnic cleansing operation is under
way.., let's register indications that dark things are happening, even if we are not able to
quantify those for the time being." Press Conference of NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea
and Air Commodore David Wilby (Mar. 27, 1999) (transcript on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review) [hereinafter Shea & Wilby].
430. See generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 395.
431. See Chossudovsky, supra note 396.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
2001]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
forces resulted in a significant increase in government casualties
which in turn led to major Yugoslavian reprisal security
operations .... By the beginning of March these terror and
counter-terror operations led to the inhabitants of numerous
villages fleeing, or being dispersed to either other villages, cities
or the hills to seek refuge .... The situation was clearly that
KLA provocations, as personally witnessed in ambushes of
security patrols which inflicted fatal and other casualties, were
clear violations of the previous October's agreement [and
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199]. The
security forces responded and the consequent security
harassment and counter-operations led to an intensified
insurrectionary war, but as I have stated elsewhere, I did not
witness, nor did I have knowledge of any incidents of so-called
'ethnic cleansing' and there certainly were no occurrences of
'genocidal policies' while I was with the KVM in Kosovo. What
has transpired since the OSCE monitors were evacuated on
March 20, in order to deliver the penultimate warning to force
Yugoslavian compliance with the Rambouillet and subsequent
Paris documents and the commencement of the NATO air
bombardment of March 24, obviously has resulted in human
rights abuses and a very significant humanitarian disaster as
some 600,000 Albanian Kosovars have fled or been expelled
from the province. This did not occur, though, before March
20, so I would attribute the humanitarian disaster directly or
indirectly to the NATO air bombardment and resulting anti-
terrorist campaign.
435
While the Serb forces did not resort to genocidal policies in
addressing the guerrilla operations prior to the onset of air strikes,
the resulting civilian death toll raises serious questions under
international human rights and the laws of war. A large number
of civilians, including women and children, succumbed to the
violence.436 In light of the recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and the wide range of demographics within the former Yugoslavia,
an ethnic conflict in Kosovo presented and continues to present
substantial hazards for the spread of violence. 437 While these
435. Id. at n.30 (emphasis added) (citing Roland Keith, Failure of Diplomacy,
Returning OSCE Human Rights Monitor Offers a View from the Ground in Kosovo,
DEMOCRAT, May 1999).
436. Id.
437. This is particularly true in Macedonia, where there is a large Albanian minority.
See id.
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reasons may provide sufficiently egregious circumstances that
warrant action by the international community, it is clear that
fervent calls for intervention may not automatically legitimize any
intervention. The international community must seek the
appropriate solution in each particular case where humanitarian
intervention is deemed necessary, while subjugating any military
action under principles of international law.
2. The Exhaustion of Diplomatic Solutions
Diplomatic negotiations between NATO, the Serbs, and the
KLA were attempted in order to prevent the escalation of
violence. 438  A brief examination of the diplomatic record,
however, raises questions as to whether further negotiations could
have resulted in the suspension of air strikes.
The first significant attempt at reaching a peaceful resolution
to the conflict was made in Rambouillet, France.439 On February
6, 1999, Serb delegates met with major KLA leaders in
Rambouillet under Western leadership to prevent an escalation of
the violence. 440 The Rambouillet agreement was tendered by the
Western leadership, accepted by the KLA, and rejected by the
Serbs.441 According to Professor Chomsky, Slobodan Milosevic's
categorical refusal to accept the terms of the agreement was notsurprising.442 The proposal called for a complete military
occupation of Kosovo and the FRY, as well as substantial political
control of Kosovo by NATO.443 Slobodan Milosevic was further
438. See id.
439. See id.
440. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 106. The terms of the Rambouilet agreement can be
found at Rambouillet Accord, supra note 81.
441. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 106.
442. Id.
443. Id. The agreement provided that
NATO is to 'constitute and lead a military force' (KFOR), which 'NATO will
establish and deploy' in and around Kosovo, 'operating under the authority and
subject to the direction and political control of the North Altantic Council
(NAC) through the NATO chain of command'; 'the KFOR commander is the
final authority within theater regarding interpretation of this chapter
[Implementation of the Military Agreement] and his interpretations are binding
on all Parties and persons.' Civil affairs are to be monitored and supervised by
the (NATO-dominated) OSCE and its Chief of Implementation Mission, along
with KFOR, the NATO force occupying Kosovo ....
Id. The independence of Kosovo is to be determined three years after entry into
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informed by the Western leadership that should talks fail or
should he fail to agree to a NATO-led ground force, NATO
planes-would bomb Serbia. 444  Under these circumstances, it is
questionable whether incorporating an ultimatum for complete
military occupation into the Rambouillet negotiations proved to
be the most productive resolution for achieving the cessation of
violence.
Subsequent to the Rambouillet fiasco, several diplomatic,
albeit unsuccessful, efforts were attempted by the Serbian
government.445  On March 23, 1999, the Serbian National
Assembly issued a resolution calling for the facilitation of peaceful
diplomatic settlements while rejecting a NATO occupation as
proposed in the Rambouillet agreement.446  Additionally, the
resolution exhibited a willingness to accept some form of an
international presence.447  On April 22, 1999, after meeting with
force of the agreement and the status of the rest of the FRY is subject to the following
paragraph:
NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and
equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the
FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any
areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.
Id. at 107. In addition, NATO forces would have free access to the FRY without any
obligations under the laws of the country or to its authorities, while such authorities are
required to follow NATO orders. See id.
444. Jane Perlez, U.S. Running Out of Time to Decide on Kosovo Force, N.Y. TIES,
Feb. 12, 1999, at A12; Jane Perlez, Albright Brings Foes Face to Face at Kosovo Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al; Jane Perlez, U.S. Negotiator at the Kosovo Talks Visits
Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at A3.
445. See CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 108-14.
446. Id. at 108. The resolution called on the OSCE and the United Nations to facilitate
a peaceful diplomatic settlement while rejecting NATO military occupation. Id. The
resolution also condemned the removal of the KVM and called for negotiations leading
toward the reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for
Kosovo and Metohija [the official FRY name for the province], with the securing
of a full equality of all citizens and ethnic communities and with respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Id. at 109. Though "[t]he Serbian Parliament does not accept presence of foreign military
troops in Kosovo and Metohija,"
[tihe Serbian Parliament is ready to review the size and character of the
international presence in Kosmet [Kosovo/Metohija] for carrying out the
reached accord, immediately upon signing the political accord on the self-rule
agreed and accepted by the representatives of all national communities living in
Kosovo and Metohija.
Id. at 108.
447. Id. at 109.
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Russian representative Viktor Chernomyrdin, Milosevic agreed to
an international presence in Kosovo under U.N. auspices. 448  On
April 30, 1999, Milosevic publicly declared that: the United
Nations could have a peacekeeping force with self-defense
weapons in Kosovo; Yugoslav forces would be reduced; all
refugees of all ethnic and religious affiliations could return; and
that he was willing to discuss the widest possible autonomy for
Kosovo.
44 9
On May 8, 1999, the Group of Eight (G-8), consisting of the
major Western countries and Russia, agreed to specific terms
regarding the Kosovo conflict-terms that were accepted soon
thereafter by Milosevic. 450  The G-8 agreement essentially
provided for withdrawal of military forces, an international
security presence, self-government for Kosovo, and the
demilitarization of the KLA.451  All of these diplomatic efforts,
starting with the Serbian Resolution to the G-8 agreement, were
nevertheless rejected by NATO.452 As a result, the air strikes
448. Id. at 111. The meeting was positive and Chernomyrdin publicly declared "that
Milosevic had agreed to an 'international presence in Kosovo under United Nations
auspices' in order to achieve a political settlement and further agreed, in principle, to
"the possibility of an international presence led by the UN" if the air strikes were called
off by NATO. Id.
449. Id. at 111; Jane Perlez, Milosevic Defiant But Offers a Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1999, at Al. Milosevic called for a "political process" and stated that "the United Nations
'can have a huge mission in Kosovo if it wishes"'-a U.N. peacekeeping force with self-
defense weapons, but not "an occupation" of the sort demanded in the Rambouillet
agreement. Id. In addition, he stated that he would reduce Yugoslav forces to their pre-
bombing level; that there would be " the return of all refugees, regardless of their ethnic or
religious affiliation[;]" "free access for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and International Red Cross[;]" and further negotiations for "the widest possible
autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia." Id. at A8; CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 112.
Milosevic was "borrowing language from the proposed Rambouillet accords." CHOMSKY,
supra note 44, at 112.
450. CHOMSKY, supra note 44, at 112.
451. Id. The terms demanded
an 'immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression,' withdrawal of
(unspecified) 'military, police and paramilitary forces,' '[d]eployment in Kosovo
of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by
the United Nations,' 'a political process toward the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the other countries of the region,' and the demilitarization of the KLA.
Id. at 112.
452. See id. at 110, 112.
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continued until early June when the Kosovo Peace Accord was
accepted by NATO and Serbia.
453
In analyzing the diplomatic efforts undertaken between the
FRY government and the Allied forces, it appears that on four
occasions Milosevic exhibited a willingness to compromise by
conceding to an international presence and substantial autonomy
for Kosovo.454 Although NATO legitimately could have deemed
Milosevic's terms unsatisfactory, the Alliance's refusal to even
consider further negotiations might have resulted in the
unwarranted neglect of valuable opportunities for the
achievement of a successful diplomatic resolution to the Kosovo
conflict.
3. Paralysis of the Security Council
As the Alliance's intervention in Kosovo was undertaken
without explicit Security Council authorization for the use of
force,455  questions arise as to whether the United Nations'
inaction constituted a paralysis, thereby warranting preemption
through the intervention of non-U.N. forces.4  A brief
examination of the Security Council's exhibited willingness to
453. Id. at 114. According to the Kosovo Peace Accord, Serbia agreed to an
international security presence with substantial NATO participation (this is the only
mention of NATO). Rambouillet Accord, supra note 81. Kosovo is to be in the hands of
the U.N. Security Council (not NATO) which will establish "an interim administration of
Kosovo." Id. Military control similarly falls under U.N. control. Id. The changes
between the Rambouillet agreement and the Kosovo peace accord are significant. The
following NATO demands were not included in the KPA_ full military occupation and
political control of Kosovo by NATO; free NATO access to the rest of the FRY; and a
three year time period after which the independence of Kosovo is to be decided.
Interestingly, the Security Council resolution embodying the Kosovo Peace Accords does
not even mention NATO. Id.
454. The Alliance viewed Milosevic's diplomatic efforts as propaganda or a stalling
method as any Serb resistance, deliberation, or suggested alteration of the Alliance's terms
has been labeled as such before, during, and after the conflict. See William Drozdiak,
West Vows New Sanctions on Yugoslavia, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1998, at A26; William
Drozdiak, B-52 Strike Devastates Field Force in Kosovo, WASH. POST, June 9, 1999, at
A19; R. Jeffrey Smith & Molly Moore, Kosovo Pullout Set to Start Today: NATO-Led
Contingent to Enter Province, WASH. POST, June 10, 1999, at Al; Kevin Cullen, Serbs,
NATO Resume Talk on a Pullout, BOSTON GLOBE, June 9, 1999, at Al; Perlez, supra note
449, at Al.
455. No resolution was enacted permitting the use of "all necessary means" to restore
international peace and security in Kosovo. "All necessary means" is the standard
language for the use of force as exhibited in conflicts such as in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda,
and Yugoslavia. See Lobel & Ratner, supra note 124, at 128.
456. See Tes6n, supra note 143, at 367-69.
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enact resolutions leads to the conclusion that characterizing the
United Nations' inaction in the Kosovo conflict as a "paralysis" is
unwarranted. Instead, the resulting lack of authorization
illustrates the precise function for which the veto powers were
meant to exist: to ensure unanimity of action while preserving
plurality of opinion.
As previously discussed,4  unanimity of votes is an essential
requirement for the enactment of Security Council resolutions.
458
This requirement may not be forthcoming where permanent
members possess differing political opinions.45 -  Such
disagreements, while representative of the importance of the veto
power, can result in effective paralysis. 460  Despite this, a brief
examination of Security Council practice since the end of the Cold
War appears to evidence a disposition for unanimous action, and
consequently the absence of a bipolar handicap. 461 The Security
Council clearly has authorized, on numerous occasions, the use of
force in previous conflicts such as in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and
Yugoslavia. 462 It is in this light that the lack of Security Council
action in Kosovo must be addressed.
While the events in Kosovo exhibited the alarming qualities
of a bitter ethnic conflict, it is essential for intervening states to
respect the significance of the Security Council's decision not to
take action. 463  The fact that Russia and China clearly voiced
refusal to support an authorization for the use of force illustrates
the vitality of the Security Council's ability to represent the
differences of political views harbored by the leading powers of
457. See supra Part III.A.3.
458. See Burmester, supra note 115, at 271-72. The Council's decisions are governed
by Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter, which provides that Security Council action requires
"the concurring votes of the permanent members". U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
Consequently, for an intervention to occur, all permanent members (United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) must agree as to whether the intervention
should take place. See generally id.
459. See Burmester, supra note 115, at 271-72.
460. This was evidenced throughout the Cold War. See Brown, supra note 165, at 236;
see also Nanda, supra note 169, at 310.
461. Nanda, supra note 169, at 310.
462. See supra Part II.A.2.iii.c.; Nanda, supra note 169, at 310.
463. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTER art.
103.
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this world.464 As the two countries were aware of NATO's
predisposition to conduct air strikes, they refused to vote for a
resolution permitting the use of "all necessary" means to restore
international peace and security because it would have authorized
a bombardment of the FRY.465 These countries would have
deemed such a result unacceptable and illegal.466
Regardless of the grounds for these refusals, it is the
prerogative of the Security Council to refrain from intervening
where permanent members deem it inappropriate. 467 To deny this
right by subjugating this decision to a regional organization's
conclusion that air strikes are warranted would lead to the
dangerous eventuality of competing claims to the right of forceful
intervention. 468  It is consequently incumbent upon the
464. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, U.N. Measure Skirts Outright Threat of Force Against
Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at A6.
465. By October 18, 1998, NATO declared that it was ready to bomb Serbia because of
human rights abuses. Cohen, supra note 358, at 3. In reaction to this statement, Russia
and China threatened to veto any resolution that would permit military action by NATO.
Id.; Ibrahim, supra note 464, at A6. China and Russia's reluctance to grant the
authorization for air strikes is clearly understandable. If a resolution would permit the use
of force in the FRY and NATO would begin the air strikes, China and Russia would be
unable to stop the bombardments via a resolution calling for the cessation of air strikes.
Such a resolution would be vetoed because three of the permanent members of the
Security Council (United States, France, and the United Kingdom) are members of
NATO. This scenario precisely occurred in the Kosovo crisis even though no Security
Council resolution permitted the use of force in the first place. See Press Release SC/6659,
Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Mar. 26, 1999) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review). Moreover, it is also quite doubtful that Russia and China
would have vetoed an intervention where the military arsenal would be restricted to a
limited number of armed ground troops. The prospect of a resolution authorizing the
deployment of ground troops would similarly face the additional hurdle of a veto within
the Security Council due to the fact that three members of the Security Council are NATO
members who were clearly advocating the benefits of air strikes. Furthermore, it is also
quite doubtful whether any U.N. members would have been willing to commit any ground
troops within Kosovo. Likewise, Russia and China might have refused to authorize "all
necessary" means in the belief that bombing could be averted, as further diplomatic efforts
could prove successful in proving a resolution to the conflict.
466. Judith Miller, The Secretary General Offers Implicit Endorsement of Raids, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A13.
467. Id.
468. There is fear
that abandonment of the Security Council's asserted monopoly on determining
the lawful use of force against others, except in self-defense, could put the world
community on a slippery slope of competing claims of 'rights' to intervene -with
the potential consequence of escalating hostilities rather than resolving them.
Some see a disquieting historical precedent for alliance self-authorization for use
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international community to respect the centrality of the United
Nations in addressing conflicts that involve extensive international
repercussions. In such instances, the international community
must defer to the Security Council's decisions addressing the use
of force.
469
4. Proportionality
Although the damages inflicted upon the FRY will be
discussed in greater detail below, it is highly questionable whether
such damages were proportional to the military advantages
anticipated. The air strikes were largely conducted for the
protection of human rights in Kosovo, but the bombardments left
disastrous consequences upon the infrastructure and civilian
population of the FRY.470 Bombs damaged and destroyed water
supplies, chemical plants, and caused the deaths of well over 2,000
Yugoslavian civilians located hundreds of kilometers from
Kosovo.471 The repercussions include the discharge of dangerous
chemicals, while the destruction of water supplies effectively
restricted civilians' essential access to potable water.47 2 Whether
these results were necessary to achieve the cessation of violence in
Kosovo is debatable.
5. Summary
In examining the various considerations for a legitimate
humanitarian intervention lacking Security Council authorization,
although NATO's intervention had some moral justification for its
publicized humanitarian motives, there is scarce legal support for
its legitimacy.
of force in the Warsaw Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (an
intervention that was, to be sure, directed within its own membership). Some
warn that such fragmentation of lawful authority on use of force could prompt
the emergence of counter-alliances among those fearful of high-handed
interventionism by an overweening Western alliance. If the U.N. has too many
inhibitions about the use of force, these worry, NATO under U.S. pressure may
have too few.
Simma, supra note 61.
469. In the case of the Kosovo conflict, it is the need to respect the refusal of the
Security Council to enact resolutions permitting the use of force.
470. See supra Part III.A.
471. Id.
472. Id.
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Human rights violations were certainly occurring within
Kosovo, presenting alarming conditions for the spread of violence.
The conflict, however, never reached the genocidal proportions
suggested by NATO officials. In attempting to alleviate the
severity of the conflict, NATO directed the Serbs to abide by the
Rambouillet agreements, effectively establishing an ultimatum and
subsequently ignoring any diplomatic efforts undertaken by the
Serbian government. These diplomatic efforts were arguably
irrelevant as the Serbs could not be trusted in light of their history
of breaking the cease fire agreements established by Holbrooke in
October 1998. This argument, however, is based on a
considerable fallacy. It has been repeatedly declared that it was
not the Serbs, but rather, the KLA guerrillas that caused the
renewed fighting. Consequently, overlooking the Serbs'
diplomatic efforts might have resulted in the loss of considerable
opportunities for the cessation of violence. One might also find
that the Security Council was not, in fact, paralyzed by the Kosovo
conflict. Categorizing the inaction of the Security Council as a
paralysis simply mischaracterizes the inherent nature of the
Council and overlooks a noticeable period of concerted action as a
remedy for violence. Finally, it is the methods of remedying a
particular conflict that will bear considerable scrutiny under the
laws of war. As will be discussed in greater detail below, any
intervention must abide by the doctrine of proportionality, a
notion that has apparently been eroded by NATO's intervention
in Kosovo.
In analyzing these considerations in totality, the strength and
importance of human rights violations tends to overshadow other
relevant issues. The importance of other issues, however, must
not be disregarded, such as recognizing the centrality of the
Security Council's role and decisions, the usefulness and necessity
of diplomatic avenues, and the need to abide by rules of
proportionality where an intervention is undertaken. An
examination of these seemingly non-humanitarian considerations,
particularly the proportionality doctrine, reveals that international
law does not recognize NATO's intervention.
B. The Lawfulness of NATO's Air Strikes Under Protocol I
Although NATO used some of the most accurate bombs and
missiles in the American arsenal, the extent of civilian deaths and
the scope of resulting damages in the FRY raise significant
[Vol. 23:329
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questions as to the legitimacy of the Alliance's tactics. 413 Under
Protocol I, it remains the responsibility of the intervening forces to
achieve military effectiveness while minimizing civilian injury and
damage. 474  Intervening forces consequently must decide the
appropriateness of military action by considering the prevalent
characteristics of the military conflict in order to broaden the
scope of civilian safety. According to this standard, the Alliance's
targets, as well as its methods, may have run afoul of international
law.
1. Methods and Means of Warfare
In examining the Alliance's methods and means of warfare,
NATO appears to have placed considerations of military necessity
and the accomplishment of military objectives above civilian
safety. During most of the humanitarian operation, NATO
aircraft flew at high altitudes, a factor that led to disastrous
misidentification of military targets and the deaths of numerous
civilians.475 Moreover, NATO's arsenal included weapons such as
cluster bombs and depleted uranium (DU) ammunitions that
present considerable dangers to the civilian population even well
after the conclusion of the conflict.476 Consequently, the decision
to resort to these methods and means of warfare for the
accomplishment of military objectives considerably diminished
NATO's capacity to control excessive and unnecessary damage to
the civilian population and may have constituted indiscriminate
use of military force.
a. Cluster Bombs
Despite the large number of precision-guided weapons
utilized throughout Operation Allied Force, NATO forces also
resorted to "area weapons," such as cluster bombs, in a multitude
of aerial attacks.477 As explained by William Arkin in Human
Rights Watch Report, although cluster bombs are highly effective
473. William M. Arkin, Ticking Time Bombs, 11 HUM. RTS. WATCH 4,6 (June 1999).
474. See generally, Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51.
475. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, HUM. RTS. WATCH 2(Feb. 2000).
476. Arkin, supra note 473, at 4.
477. William Arkin, NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, 11 HUM. RTS.
WATCH 3 (May 1999). Both British and U.S. forces acknowledged the use of CBU-87 and
RBL 755 cluster bombs in the Kosovo conflict. Arkin, supra note 473, at 2.
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in targeting a large area, they are also largely unpredictable due to
the high failure rate of the submunitions contained inside the
cluster bombs.478 Additionally, cluster bombs present singular
dangers when released at higher altitudes because high altitudes
lead to a greater range of dispersion and the increased potential
for technical malfunction.479-  Once these bombs land, the
submunitions turn into landmines, incapable of distinguishing
between combatants and innocent civilians, and the slightest touch
causes them to detonate.480  This indiscriminate effect renders
NATO's use of these area weapons highly questionable under
international law.
The nature of cluster bomb weapons enables the attacking
forces to cover a wide area, inflicting considerable damage to
ground troops dispersed throughout a particular region. 48 1 There
exist two types of cluster bombs-those delivered by surface
artillery or rockets, and those delivered by air.482  Operation
Allied Force used air-delivery cluster bombs, which are essentially
dispensers containing a number of submunitions commonly called
bomblets.483 Once these dispensers are released into the air, the
cluster bomb falls for a specified distance before opening and
releasing the bomblets over a large target area.484 The diameter
of impact for each individual bomblet can vary from 250 to 500
feet.485 The resulting damage is substantial, as the charge has the
ability to penetrate five inches of armor on contact. 486 In addition,
"the tiny steel case fragments are powerful enough to damage
light armor and trucks at fifty feet, and to cause human injury at
500 feet" while "the incendiary ring can start fires in any
combustible environment.
'" 487
Although cluster bombs appear effective in attacking ground
elements, they harbor a significant failure rate.488 It is generally
478. Arkin, supra note 473, at 3.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Estimates of overall dud rates vary. According to the conservative estimates of
manufacturers, two to five percent of bomblets remain unexploded. Id. at 5. This estimate
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estimated that for every single CBU-87 (containing a total of 202
bomblets) used, there will be an average of ten unexploded
bomblets, and for every RBL755 (containing a total of 147
bomblets) used, there will be an average of five unexploded
bomblets 8 9 These undetonated bomblets settle wherever they
land and form a grave lingering danger to the noncombatant
civilian population, as well as to the friendly ground force
operations. 90
In light of the uncontrollable nature of the bomblets'
explosions, cluster bombs represent an excessive civilian hazard,
and may violate Article 51 of Protocol I, which forbids
indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population. 491 Indiscriminate
attacks are "[tihose which employ a method or means of combat
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol
... and consequently ... are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.'
492
In addition, Article 51 further describes an indiscriminate attack
as "[an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 493  Thus,
Protocol I forbids an attack where the weapons utilized are unable
to distinguish between military objectives and civilians. Because
cluster bombs cannot distinguish between these two entities, their
use violates Protocol I.
The use of cluster bombs during the air strikes led to
considerable civilian casualties. 494 In one incident, cluster bombs
originally designed to hit an airfield went astray, and landed in
three centrally located urban areas.495 The attack killed fourteen
civilians and wounded twenty-eight.496 Although NATO officials
rises to twenty-three percent observed in acceptance and operational testing, and ten to
thirty percent in ground observations in areas of Iraq after the Gulf War. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 2.
491. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(4).
492. Id.
493. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
494. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Campaign, supra note 475, at 3.
495. It, see also id. app. A (describing incidents involving civilian deaths in Operation
Allied Force).
496. See id. app. A.
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claimed the intended target was an airfield and that the resulting
damage might have been due to an inadvertent release or
technical malfunction, the White House, following the incident,
issued a directive to the Pentagon to restrict cluster bomb use.497
According to U.S. Air Force sources, the cluster bomb container
opened immediately after its release, projecting submunitions at a
greater distance.498 It is possible that these consequences could
have been averted.499 In his Human Rights Watch Report,
William Arkin describes the deleterious effect of dropping cluster
bombs at high altitudes:
[t]he higher the altitude at which cluster bombs are dropped,
the wider will be the dispersal radius of the submunitions, and
the greater, therefore, the potential risk to nonmilitary targets.
Moreover, at higher altitudes, pilots have a reduced capability
to make sighting corrections. Finally, at greater altitudes, the
bomblets do not necessarily have the opportunity to fuse
properly, and the dud rate is therefore likely to be higher.
500
In light of the fact that aerial attacks were undertaken almost
exclusively at altitudes of 15,000 feet, the technical malfunctions
appear more negligent than accidental. 50 1 Moreover, because they
were dropped in a densely populated area, the unexploded
bomblets continue to present a grave risk to civilians.
502
The total number of civilian casualties from NATO attacks
between April 10 and May 13, 1999, ranges from ninety to one-
hundred-and-fifty. 50 3 It is estimated that about 11,000 unexploded
bomblets from American cluster bombs are currently within the
territory of the FRY.50 4 Because the bomblets are not particularly
large, they pose grave threats, especially in rural areas where they
might be concealed by vegetation. 50 5  In addition, the
submunitions' shape resembles a bright yellow soda can that
appears particularly attractive to children who could mistake it for
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Arkin, supra note 473, at 6 n.15.
501. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, supra note 475, at 20.
502. Arkin, supra note 473, at 3.
503. See Civilian Deaths in the NATO Campaign, supra note 475, at 2.
504. See generally id.
505. See Arkin, supra note 473, at 3.
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a toy.50 6 For all of these reasons, the use of cluster bombs should
have been reconsidered.
b. Depleted Uranium
On March 30, 1999, NATO announced that U.S. A-10 assault
aircraft were available for use in the Kosovo conflict.50 7  These
aircraft adopted the deceptively playful nickname of
"tankbusters." 50 8 Their ammunition consists of depleted uranium
(DU), a weapon of fearsome efficiency in targeting the previously
unattainable tanks of opposing military forces.509  On April 21,
1999, NATO spokesman Giuseppe Marani confirmed that DU
weapons were being used in Yugoslavia. 510 Although the military
capabilities of DU weapons can be advantageous, but their
radioactive and toxic characteristics bear alarming health
consequences for civilian populations and military personnel who
come in contact with the released DU particles. 511  These
consequences, although emphatically denied by NATO, make DU
munitions indiscriminate weapons, capable of harming civilians
and combatants alike.
512
506. See id. at 2. These dangers are certainly not foreign to American troops, as
similar hazards were evidenced in Iraq subsequent to the Gulf War, a conflict that entailed
the widespread use of cluster bombs. Id. at 3. It is estimated that at least twenty-five U.S.
military personnel were killed and others injured by unexploded bomblets fired by their
own forces, while approximately 1,600 civilians were killed and over 2,500 injured in the
first two years after the end of the Gulf War from accidents involving unexploded
submunitions. Id. at 10-11. Kuwaiti doctors stated that approximately sixty percent of
these civilian victims are children aged fifteen and under. Id. at 11. In light of the events
in Iraq, it is likely that the remaining unexploded bomblets within the territory of the FRY
will result in similarly injurious consequences for the civilian population. See id. at 3.
507. Christine Abdelkrim-Delanne, Conflict in the Balkans-Not Such Conventional
Weapons, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, June 1999, http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/en/1999/06/08duarms (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. See Alex Kirby, Pentagon Confirms Depleted Uranium Use, BBC NEWS (May 7,
1999), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_337000/337855.stm.
512. Id. The military use of depleted uranium (DU) is mainly based on the metal's low
cost and unusual effectiveness. Abdelkrim-Delanne, supra note 507. A thirty-three
millimeter DU round from U.S. A-10 Warthog aircraft can pierce steel armor up to nine
centimeters (3.5 inches) thick as well as a block of concrete three meters underground.
Vladimir S. Zajic, Review of Radioactivity, Military Use, and Health Effects of Depleted
Uranium (July 1999) http://members.tripod.comlvzajic/, at 3.4; Abdelkrim-Delanne, supra
note 534. It was in the early 1970s that the U.S. Army began to explore the use of DU for
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Depleted uranium carries the greatest peril to human health
when it is inhaled or ingested.513 As it is released in the air, it can
be internalized by "breathing smoke containing DU particles,
hand-to- mouth transfer as a result of contact with contaminated
vehicles, inhalation or ingestion of resuspended particles,
ingestion of food or water contaminated by DU, contamination of
wounds by DU dust, or from wounds caused by DU shrapnel.,
514
penetrators and tank armor. See id. At first, DU was considered in tandem with tungsten,
but the latter was eventually discarded as DU is highly available and exhibits pyrophoric
qualities, while tungsten has a higher melting point (34100 C) than uranium (11320 C) and
lacks pyrophoricity. Id. As a result, when a tungsten projectile hits its target, it becomes
blunt on impact and is consequently less effective in piercing armor. Id.
The hardened density of DU is obtained through a reduction of its carbon content
and by alloying it with a particular amount of titanium. Id. The resulting DU penetrator is
subsequently encased in an aluminum sabot and a combustible cartridge case. Id. As the
projectile is fired, the aluminum sabot of the DU round "drops off within the first 100m of
the trajectory and the bare DU projectile then moves with velocity 1.5 kmlsec." Id. Once
the projectile comes in contact with the intended target, the "[slurface of a DU penetrator
ignites on impact (especially with steel), partially liquefies due to the high temperature
generated by the impact and relatively low melting point of uranium (11320 C), and the
projectile sharpens as it melts and pierces the heavy armor." Id.
The effect of the penetrator's impact bears important consequences for the
civilian population and military personnel. Upon impact, approximately eighteen to
seventy percent of the penetrator rod will burn and oxidize into dust. Ict, see also
BERNARD ROSTKER, ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE REPORT: DEPLETED URANIUM IN
TIE GULF 12 (Dep't of Def., July 1998) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review). This DU oxide is deadly due to its
radioactive character and will kill everyone inside a tank, armored vehicle, or other
selected target. E-mail from Dr. Rosalie Bertell to Geocities.com via e-mail contact
Catherine Euler (Mar. 31, 1999, 20:56 PM), available at
http://www.geocities.com/zl997z/yu/depluran.html.
The solubility and respirability of the DU aerosol's qualities will determine its
subsequent effect on the target's surroundings. Zajic, supra, at 6.6. Two types of DU
oxides are formed-one is soluble in water while the other is not. Id. In addition, it is
estimated that of the DU oxide aerosol formed at the impact, fifty to ninety-six percent
are respirable particles, some which are soluble in water. Id. The non-respirable particles
will settle down rapidly, while "the respirable DU aerosol remains airborne for hours."
Id; ROSTKER, supra, at 12. The solubility of respirable particles will determine the rate at
which the particles will enter the blood stream where a human comes upon DU particles
subsequent to impact. Zajic, supra, at 6.6. Approximately seventy percent of the soluble
uranium that enters the blood stream will be excreted in urine within twenty-four hours,
while the remainder will be deposited in the kidneys and bones. Id. About twenty-five
percent of the respirable DU particles will be trapped in the lungs, where insoluble
particles can remain for years, while about twenty-five percent will be exhaled, and the
remaining 50% swallowed. Id For a comprehensive discussion of the long term effects of
DU upon humans, see ScI. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP. (SAIC), KINETIC ENERGY
PENETRATOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS App. D (July 1990).
513. Zajic, supra note 512, at 6.6.
514. Id.; Dan Fahey, Depleted Uranium-The Stone Unturned: A Report on
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It can remain in the liver, kidney, bones or other tissues,
irradiating these tissues for years. 515  It can damage the renal
system, cause genetic deformities, and initiate cancer. 6 Professor
Siegwart Horst-Gunther categorized the following consequences
from contact with DU munitions:
1) A considerable increase in infectious diseases caused by
severe immuno-deficiencies in a great part of the population. 2)
Frequent occurrence of massive herpes and zoster afflictions,
also in children. 3) AIDS-like syndromes. 4) A hitherto
unknown syndrome caused by renal and hepatic dysfunctions..
5) Leukemia, aplastic anaemia and malignant neoplasm. 6)
Congenital deformities caused by genetic defects; also partly
diagnosed in animals.
517
Although NATO member states deny the dangerous effects of
DU to civilian populations, 518 leading scientists advocate the
cessation of DU use.
519
The use of DU also appears to violate various Articles of
Protocol I. Article 51 states that indiscriminate attacks are
prohibited. 520  These include "those which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by this Protocol ... and consequently ... are of a nature
to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction." 521 Article 51 further provides an example of an
attack deemed indiscriminate: "an attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
Exposures of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others to Depleted Uranium
Contamination, SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, Mar. 28, 1997, http://www.rama-
usa.org/du01.htm (last modified Dec. 1997).
515. Zajic, supra note 512, at 6.6.
516. Id.
517. Professor Siegwart Horst-Gunther, The Gulf War Syndrome-A Parallel to
Chernobyl: Documentation of the Aftermath of the Gulf War,
http://www.wakefieldcam.freeserve.co.uk/gulfwarsyndrome.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2001).
518. See Robert Fisk, I'd Like to Believe NATO that Depleted Uranium Is Harmless.
But I Don't. And This Is Why..., INDEP. (London), Oct. 4, 1999, at 3.
519. See Felicity Arbuthnot, Poisoned Legacy, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Sept. 1999,
at 13.
520. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(4).
521. Id. art. 51(4)(c).
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anticipated."522  Additionally, Article 57 imposes similar
requirements when deciding to attack.523 Protocol I therefore
requires military commanders to assess whether the methods and
means of combat can adequately be undertaken without excessive
harm to the civilian population. Considering the consequences
that DU radioactive particles may engender among non-
combatants, the decision to use such weapons appears excessive.
Whereas NATO has confirmed the use of DU weapons in
Yugoslavia, 524 it has not released information regarding the
quantity of DU shells used or the whereabouts of military
targets. 25 Nevertheless, a brief examination of the use and effect
of DU weapons in the Gulf War may illustrate the extent of
damage that such ammunitions may generate. It is estimated by
U.S. armed forces that more than 14,000 rounds were used by U.S.
troops.5 26 Of the 14,000 rounds, 7,000 were used for training in
the Saudi Arabian desert prior to the Gulf War, and 3,000 were
lost in a fire at a U.S. Army arms dump in Kuwait.527 Depleted
uranium rounds were also used by the British, and probably other
armed forces, increasing the total amount of DU rounds used in
the Gulf War.528 The consequences are that it is now estimated
that DU was the leading cause of the Gulf War Syndrome and
triggered the extraordinary rise in cancer rates and birth
deformities in Gulf War veterans. 529 In a survey of 10,000 Gulf
War veterans who complained of mysterious illnesses, eighty-two530
percent entered Iraqi vehicles contaminated with DU. In
another study undertaken by Dr. Hari Sharma of the University of
Waterloo, veterans suffering from various symptoms showed
traces of DU in their urine samples.531 Some veterans had one
hundred times the safe limit in their bodies.532 Additionally, it is
522. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
523. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
524. Kirby, supra note 511.
525. UNEP/UNCHS BALKANS TASK FORCE, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON HUMAN
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT ARISING FROM POSSIBLE USE OF DEPLETED
URANIUM DURING THE 1999 Kosovo CoNFLIr-A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 24
(Oct. 1999).
526. Abdelkrim-Delanne, supra note 507.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Zajic, supra note 512, at 9.2.
531. Arbuthnot, supra note 519, at 13.
532. Id.
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estimated that sixty-seven percent of children born to U.S. Gulf
Veterans have severe illnesses or birth defects.
533
These disturbing trends are mirrored in Iraq. A study of
cancer and leukemia in Iraqi soldiers from heavily bombed areas
showed extraordinary increases in lymphoma (from ten cases in
1991 to 106 cases in 1996) and brain cancer (from one case in 1991
to forty cases in 1996). 534 Depleted uranium is also suspected as
the direct cause of a large increase in stillbirth and birth defects.
535
Dr. Jenan Ali at Basra General Hospital in Iraq "has a
photographic record of all the babies born with no eyes, brains,
limbs, genitalia; internal organs on the outside; grotesquely
deformed little heads and bodies." 536 In an informal survey of 160
houses, twenty malformed babies were counted.537 The spread of
contamination may consequently be explained by the fact that
radiation levels in flora and fauna reached eighty-four times the
World Health Organization's recommended safe limit.538  The
surprising similarities and timing between diseases and deformities
in Gulf War veterans, their families and the Iraqi population, in
tandem with the strong residue of DU in the studies undertaken
for Gulf War Syndrome, tends to show that DU presents
considerable repercussions for civilian populations.
Although NATO may reject these scientific findings, its
refusal to acknowledge the dangers of DU is extraordinary in light
of the numerous reports over the past ten years.539 These reports
warn of harms associated with DU.5 40  For example, an
unpublished report for the European Commission prepared by
the Regional Centre for Central and Eastern Europe effectively
warns of DU's harmful consequences. 541  It correlates the
radioactive air pollution detected in Yugoslavia to DU shells used
by U.S. war planes in the Kosovo War, and states that DU is
perhaps "the most dangerous of the cancer-causing and toxic
533. Abdelkrim-Delanne, supra note 507.
534. Arbuthnot, supra note 519, at 12.
535. Id. at 14.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id
539. See, e.g., Fahey, supra note 514.
540. Id.
541. Graham N. Greene, Kosovo Fallout: Canadian Personnel May Be Exposed to
Radiation Contamination, NAT'L POST, July 26, 1999, at A14.
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substances released during the bombing." 542 An earlier report
prepared for the U.S. Army in 1990 seems to reiterate this
warning, stating that DU has effectively been linked to cancer and
chemical toxicity causing kidney damage.543  In addition, this
report states that a charred shell is approximately three times
more radioactive than what is safe for the general public.544 In
1995, the U.S. Army's Environmental Policy Institute similarly
declared that if DU enters the body, it has potential to generate
significant medical consequences, both chemical and
radiological.545 According to the Institute, radioactivity only
begins to diminish after 4,500 million years.546  Finally, an
alarming report from Britain's Atomic Energy Authority in 1991
states that at least forty tons of DU were left on the ground in the
Gulf War-an amount sufficient to cause 500,000 potential
deaths 547
In addition to these reports, guidelines prepared by the U.S.
Army evidence considerable anxiety regarding DU
contamination. 548 In a technical dossier published by the U.S.
Army in 1990, detailed advice is given in the event of an accident
involving DU.5 4 9 It provides that "[nlo equipment or materials
involved in the accident/incident are to be removed from the site
for unrestricted use until the item(s) have been monitored by
radiation protection personnel and decontaminated as
required. ' ' 55u This guide further states that:
... as they burn, high explosives melt, flow, drip, spread, and
mix with surrounding ground or wreckage. After the fire is
extinguished, the explosives are safe only if they are completely
burned. High explosives which have not completely burned
remain an extreme explosive hazard. After these explosives
have cooled below ignition temperature they will, like metal,
take on curious shapes. They may have picked up impurities
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id
546. Arbuthnot, supra note 519, at 12.
547. See Abdelkrim-Delanne, supra note 507.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id.
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while molten or burning, which will make them actually more
dangerous than they were before melting.
551
Similar guidelines were given by the U.S. Army's
Environmental Policy Institute, emphasizing that low level
radioactive waste must be deposited in a licensed repository, and
that if DU insoluble particles are inhaled, they will stay in the
lungs and create a potential cancer risk.552 Likewise, U.K. Armed
Forces Minister Douglas Henderson also gave instructions stating
that no troops were to approach any target that might have been
hit by DU unless wearing protective clothing against radiation.
553
These guidelines were conveyed to peacekeeping officers in the
Kosovo region who were urged to stay 150 feet away from targets
of DU munition explosions.
5 4
The dangers that DU weapons consequently represent for
civilian populations are quite extraordinary. These hazards were
effectively acknowledged by the U.N. Human Rights Tribunal in
August 1996.555 In a session of the U.N. Commission of Human
Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities passed a resolution in which it "urged
all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb
production and spread of weapons of mass destruction or with
indiscriminate inflicts injury upon combatants and non-
combatants alike. This is precisely forbidden under Protocol 1.556
c. High Aircraft Altitude
Throughout most of Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft
flew at the minimum altitude of 15,000 feet.557 Although military
commanders advocated the technical abilities of NATO's arsenal,
visual perception remains a crucial element when particular
weapons require adequate identification of ground military
targets. 558  This tactical decision to maintain a high altitude
551. Id.
552. Arbuthnot, supra note 519, at 12.
553. Id.
554. Robert Fisk, Exposed: The Deadly Legacy of NATO Strikes in Kosovo, INDEP.
(London), Oct. 4, 1999, at 1.
555. See id.
556. See Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51 para. 4(a)-(c), para. 4(a)(i)(6).
557. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, supra note 475, at 20.
558. Press Conference Given by Mr. Jamie Shea and Major General Walter Jertz in
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consequently diminished pilots' abilities to adequately identify the
presence of civilians when attacking convoys or mobile targets,
and to properly take sufficient measures to verify that military
targets did not have concentrations of civilians.
559
NATO's decision to fly its aircraft at the high altitude of
15,000 feet mainly rested on two rationales. 560 First, according to
military commanders, flying low would prove dangerous from a
technical standpoint. 561 It would place NATO air crews into the
range of tactical surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and
small arms fire.562 This danger would be further exacerbated by
the fact that flying at a low altitude would highlight aircraft against
the clouds, making it easier for opposing ground troops to target
them from the ground.5 63 Second, because air crews must have
adequate space to maneuver in combat, the mountainous terrain
presented threat of a collision. 564 If at all distracted, the pilots'
unfamiliarity with the geographical terrain would place them at
risk of collision with the mountainous region when flying at low
altitudes. 565 For these reasons, NATO commanders concluded
that flying at a higher altitude would prevent or at least lower the
number of casualties among its pilots.
566
Although some of NATO's weapons require laser guidance,
other weapons require that pilots see the target throughout the
attack in order to ensure precision and to prevent civilian
casualties and damages.567 It is questionable whether the latter
category of weapons could function at optimum capacity in light of
the high altitude of the planes. 568  Such shortcomings are
illustrated in the various incidents involving civilian refugees
confused as military forces. In one particular incident, a dozen
NATO planes attacked what appeared to be a military convoy,
Brussels 2 (May 10, 1999) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review) [hereinafter Shea & Jertz].
559. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, supra note 475, at 2.
560. Shea & Jertz, supra note 560, at 2.
561. Id.
562. Id
563. Id
564. Id
565. Id.
566. See id.
567. Id.
568. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, supra note 475, at 2.
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dropping a total of nine bombs.569 The attacks resulted in the
deaths of seventy-three refugees as the pilots had mistaken the
tractors in the convoy for military tanks.5'0 In subsequent NATO
press conferences covering the event, senior officials conceded the
difficulty in correctly identifying ground elements at such an
altitude. 571 In another incident involving the deaths of innocent
civilians, NATO planes mistakenly identified a refugee camp as a
military camp and command post.572 The attack resulted in the
deaths of eighty-seven civilians.573  Although there were
unconfirmed reports that Serb forces forced these refugees into
the area in order to serve as human shields, it is uncertain whether
sufficient measures were taken to verify that the target had no
such concentration of civilians.
574
Although NATO's regard for the safety of its own pilots was
certainly legitimate, questions arise as to what extent military
commanders are obligated to expose their own forces to danger in
order to limit civilian casualties and damages. The legal
responsibility of ensuring civilian safety and properly identifying
military targets rests upon the military forces waging the attack.
573
Article 57 of Protocol I imposes the requirement on "[t]hose who
plan or decide upon an attack" to "[d]o everything feasible to
verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor
civilian objects[;] '576 to "[t]ake all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding,
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects[;] '5 77 and to
"[rlefrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause... [such consequences that] would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
569. Id. app. A.
570. Id
571. Id. at 20. Officials similarly admitted in response to a question regarding the
accuracy of high altitude bombing that effectiveness is better achieved where pilots move
closer to the intended target. Shea & Jertz, supra note 560, at .2
572. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, supra note 475, app. A.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
577. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
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anticipated. 578 In its authoritative Commentary on the Protocols,
the International Committee of the Red Cross describes what is
meant by "feasible"-"[w]hat is required ... is to take the
necessary identification measures in good time in order to spare
the population as far as possible.' ' 79  Moreover, Article 57
similarly imposes the general requirement that "in the conduct of
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects." 580  It is
consequently of utmost importance for military forces to
implement effective procedures ensuring adequate protection of
civilians and civilian objects.
581
In examining the incidents mentioned above, a careful
investigation of the intended targets would have prevented the
excessive number of civilian casualties. NATO had to be aware of
the close proximity of refugees to the Serb military because
refugees poured out of Kosovo while Serb forces advanced.
Because Kosovo is highly agricultural and many civilians were
known to have tractors, NATO also should have anticipated
identifying camps and moving objects as civilian. NATO's
decision to keep its planes at a minimum altitude of 15,000 feet
impeded pilots' ability to correctly assess the nature of the ground
elements. It is doubtful that high altitudes might directly affect
attacks where the military target is predetermined and the
weapons laser-guided. In situations where the pilot's visual
perception is a considerable factor in assessing the
appropriateness of the attack, however, maintaining an altitude
permitting adequate identification of targets is crucial.582
Consequently, NATO's deliberate choice to maintain an altitude
of 15,000 feet makes it doubtful that NATO did everything
feasible to verify that the objectives were not civilians or civilian
objects, nor did it take all necessary precautions in its methods of
attack to minimize such consequences. NATO's subsequent
review of its own tactical methods seems to support this
578. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
579. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 681-82 para. 2198 (Yves
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
580. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(1).
581. Id.
582. See Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, supra note 475, app. A.
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conclusion.583 While it is unequivocal that military forces have an
interest in the safety of their pilots, it is nevertheless the legal
responsibility of such forces to balance military necessity with
civilian safety. In this case, NATO seems to have subjugated
civilian safety for the protection of its own pilots.
2. The Legitimacy of Targets
In its humanitarian mission, NATO claims to have selected
only adversarial military operations to diminish the strength of the
FRY military.584 Although military operations obviously serve the
furtherance of the opposing forces' military campaign, their
destruction could lead to significant consequences for civilian
populations. 585 According to Protocol I, when selecting a target, it
is insufficient to merely examine whether a target serves a
considerable military purpose.586 Attacking forces must consider
a number of factors in making a decision to bomb an intended
target.587 These considerations must include the extent of civilian
presence within the intended target,588 the nature of the target's
civilian use, 589 and the extent of damage expected from the
target's explosion. 590 Specifically, NATO should analyze eventual
collateral damage, potential release of noxious chemicals, and the
possibility of the resulting damage obstructing civilian access to
objects necessary to survival. 9-1  Such considerations must
subsequently be included in a balancing equation between civilian
protection and military necessity. 592  Where military necessity
overrides the importance of these civilian damages and injuries,
the attack will be deemed legitimate under Protocol I. 593  It is
583. See id.
584. See Press Conference Given By Mr. Peter Daniel and Major General Walter
Jertz, Mr. Isa Zymberi, in Brussels and Mr. Fatmir Gashi in Kukes (May 24, 1999)
(transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Review) [hereinafter Daniel].
585. See, e.g., Chossudovsky, supra note 396.
586. See Protocol I, supra note 3.
587. See generally id
588. See id
589. See id
590. See id
591. See id.
592. Protocol I, supra note 3, arts. 51(5), 57(2).
593. Id.
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evident that military necessity must be substantial in order to
eclipse civilian harm.
Operation Allied Force targeted power plants, electric plants,
water facilities, various factories, refineries and warehouses,
bridges, railways, hospitals, public buildings, embassies, and
agricultural resources. Although NATO forces advocated
targeting these operations because of their military purposes, the
prevalent damage to civilian populations and infrastructure raises
doubts as to the legitimacy of such targets under the standards of
Protocol I.
a. Water
Throughout the Alliance's intervention, NATO objectives
focused on diminishing the strength of Slobodan Milosevic's
military forces by targeting various military operations within the
territory of the FRY.595 In furthering these tactics, the Alliance's
air force targeted power generators and electricity supplies,
attacks that directly resulted in the obstruction of civilian access to
potable water.596  In light of water's indispensable nature for
civilian populations, the destruction or damage of water supplies
certainly appears questionable under Protocol 1. 5 97
Although NATO claims not to have targeted water supplies,
it did target power generators and electricity supplies that directly
provided for civilian access to potable water.598  Justification for
these attacks was based on the fact that such operations were used
in furtherance of Serb military objectives and were therefore
594. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, White
Book 1, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/bela.htm; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, White Book 2, http://www.mfa.gov.yu/bela2.htm (on fie with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review).
595. See Daniel, supra note 586.
596. See White Book 1, supra note 596; White Book 2, supra note 596; ICRC, Crisis in
the Balkans-Situation report No. 35, May 26, 1999,; ICRC, Update No 99/03 on the Red
Cross/Red Crescent Response to the Crisis in the Balkans, June 4, 1999; ICRC,
Yugoslavia: Clean Water for Novi Sad and Vojvodina, ICRC News 99/25 [hereinafter
ICRC News 99/25], June 24, 1999; Serbia Without Electricity and Water, SERBIA-
INFO.COM, May 22, 1999, http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-05/22/12029.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2000); Protests Against Destruction of Electric Power System, SERBIA-
INFO.COM, May 25, 1999, http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-05/25/12105.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2000).
597. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 54.
598. Serbia Without Electricity and Water, supra note 598; Protests Against
Destruction of Electric Power System, supra note 598.
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legitimate military targets.599  Water pumping stations run on
electricity and are a fundamental factor in providing potable water
to civilians. Therefore, the destruction of these electrical supplies
and power generators resulted in the obstruction of civilian access
to potable water.6 °° By May 25, 1999, NATO effectively cut off
the water supply to seventy percent of civilians in Serbia; it is
estimated that Belgrade water supplies were running at ten
percent of their capacity.
60 1
Operations that service both the military and civilians,
particularly where such operations are indispensable- to survival,
are afforded particular protection under Protocol I. According to
Article 54:
[iut is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
such as ... drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for
their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the
adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve
out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other
motive.
602
This ban, however, does not apply where these objects are
used "solely for the members of the armed forces" or "in direct
support of military action."60 3 Additionally, any target selected by
the attacking forces must be "limited strictly to military
objectives." 60 4 Article 52 provides that "military objectives are
limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage." 60 5 Furthermore, under Article 57, "[t]hose who plan
or decide upon an attack" must "[r]efrain from deciding to launch
599. See Daniel, supra note 586.
600. Id.
601. NATO Denies Targeting Water Supplies, BBC NEWS (May 24, 1999), at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/hiIenglish/world/europe/newsid_351000/351780.stm [hereinafter
Water Supplies].
602. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 54(2).
603. Id. art. 54(3).
604. Id. art. 52(2).
605. Id
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any attack which may be expected to cause ... damage to civilian
objects ... which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. 6 °6 In other words, an
attack must specifically target military objectives that provide a
definite military advantage. The intentional targeting of objects
indispensable to the civilian population is absolutely forbidden
unless the particular objects are directly or solely supporting the
opposing military's forces. 607 Moreover, any attack undertaken
must not lead to any excessive civilian damage in comparison to
the military objective sought to be achieved.
In examining NATO's decision to strike power generators
and electrical facilities, the legitimacy and underlying logic of
striking such military targets is debatable. The Alliance's decision
to target such objects was based on its objective "to cause
difficulties to the military complex in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia." 60 8  Cutting off electricity would deny the Serb
military access to all modern commodities, and cut off the use of
all facilities and equipment requiring the use of electricity. This
would deprive the FRY military of electrical lighting, computers,
heating or air conditioning, and indeed, water. Although NATO
maintains that it never intended to target water supplies, NATO
apparently did not consider hydraulic engineering. 6 09 Shutting off
electricity to water supplies will automatically result in the
obstruction of access to water because water is distributed with
the aid of a pumping station running on electricity.610 NATO, by
targeting electricity to cut off water supplies to the military,
similarly cut off water supply to approximately seventy percent of
the civilian population. 61  According to Article 54 of Protocol I,
denying civilian access to indispensable objects is forbidden where
the purpose of the attack is to deny the civilian population or the
opposing military forces. access to such indispensable objects.612
Indispensable objects are legitimate targets under certain
circumstances. Although Article 54 forbids the destruction of
indispensable objects, it permits such destruction where these
606. Id. art. 57(2).
607. Id.
608. Daniel, supra note 586.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Water Supplies, supra note 601.
612. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 54.
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objects are used "solely" or "in direct support" of the military
forces of the adverse party.613 Article 52 permits attacks only
where such attacks would provide "a definite military
advantage." 614 In examining the tactical advantages of targeting
these electrical supplies and power generators, it is doubtful that
such targets were crucial to Milosevic's army. The FRY military
possessed "plenty of back-up generators" that "[Milosevic] can
use ... to supply his military" (a fact apparently well known by
NATO military commanders).6 1 Because Milosevic's army would
suffer minimal harm, and could continue generating power
through available back up generators, Article 52's requirement
that attacks are only permissible to provide a definite military
advantage is not met. Article 54's requirement that the targets
attacked be "solely" or "in direct support" of the opposing
military forces also fails because the bombing of such targets
would result in the civilian population sustaining a complete
obstruction to water consumption.
616
The Alliance chose to carry out air strikes against facilities
supplying indispensable objects to the civilian population, with full
knowledge that such air strikes would only minimally harm its
adversary's military troops. These military strategies raise
important questions under Articles 52 and 54, and should cause
NATO to rethink its decision to label such targets "military
objectives" in the first place. Protocol I permits attacks only upon
military targets, and NATO's decision to deem power and
electrical facilities "military objectives" must be questioned.
b. Environmental Damage
As NATO airplanes persevered in their collective effort to
diminish the strength of Milosevic's troops, the Alliance began
targeting diverse military targets such as commercial industries,
fuel storages, oil refineries, and chemical industries. 617  These
attacks resulted in the release of a considerable amount of noxious
613. Id.
614. Id. art. 52.
615. Press Conference Given by Mr. Jamie Shea and Major General Walter Jertz (May
25, 1999) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative
Law Review).
616. Id.
617. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 54.
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materials due to the nature of the intended targets, particularly in
Pancevo, Kragujevac, Novi Sad, and Bor.618 Despite the fact that
these objectives might have constituted legitimate military targets,
the resulting environmental damage and potential threat to the
civilian population in those areas may prove excessive given the
military advantages anticipated by NATO forces.
In light of the highly populated areas where these industrial
complexes are located, any environmental damage resulting from
targeting such operations could lead to the contamination of a
considerable percentage of the population. 619  Article 55 of
Protocol I provides that
[clare shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.
This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or
means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to
cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population.
620
In addition, Article 51 of Protocol I forbids indiscriminate
attacks. 621 This prohibition is emphasized again in Article 57,
imposing a requirement on "those who plan or decide upon an
attack" to refrain from launching an attack where civilian harm
would be excessive in light of the military advantages
anticipated.622 It is thus incumbent upon the attacking forces to
prevent severe environmental damages by selecting the
appropriate methods of warfare to prevent excessive
environmental pollution and contamination of the civilian
population.
According to a report undertaken by a Balkan Task Force
(BTF) under the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) and the
U.N. Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS), there are four
areas-Pancevo, Kragujevac, Novi Sad, and Bor-or "hot spots"
that have been identified as bearing special environmental
618. See U.N. Env't Programme & U.N. Ctr. for Human Settlement; The Kosovo
Conflict-Consequences for the Environment & Human Settlements 9 (1999) [hereinafter
BTF Report].
619. Id. Contamination could result from inhaling or consuming toxic pollutants. Id. at
92.
620. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 55.
621. Id. art. 51.
622. Id. art. 57.
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concern.623 After visiting many key areas, the BTF concluded that
the "pollution detected at some sites is serious and poses a threat
to human health. 624 In addition, it concluded "at all of these
sites, environmental contamination due to the consequences of the
Kosovo conflict was identified" and that "the problems identified
require immediate attention.
' 625
These findings were mirrored in the discoveries of other
organizations. According to a World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWFN) team, toxic pollutants released near the places hit by
NATO bombing began to spread to surrounding areas.626 The
WWFN team similarly concluded that "there was considerable
atmospheric pollution, probably affecting the environment and
public health," and that these contaminants could threaten
groundwater drinking supplies as well as natural resources in
several countries in the area.627  In addition, the Regional
Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)
similarly issued a report on June 30, 1999, covering the main types
of environmental damages that occurred or may eventually occur
within the territory of the FRY.628
The report includes the following conclusions with regard to
the level of pollution exhibited within the FRY: high levels of
pollution around main military targets, in particular chemical
industry; ecosystems threatened, in particular river ecosystems;
food contamination resulting from soil pollution and air pollution;
drinking water contamination; human health (long term effects of
toxic/carcinogenic substances, radiation).629 One can then infer
that the BTF, WWFN, and the REC came to identical conclusions,
623. BTF Report, supra note 618, at 9.
624. This was a key conclusion in the report, although the report did state that the
Kosovo conflict did not result as an environmental catastrophe for the Balkans as a whole.
Id. at 11.
625. Id.
626. Alex Kirby, Danube Pollution Warning, BBC NEWS (Sept. 14, 1999), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_446000/446226.stm.
627. Id.
628. Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Assessment
of the Environmental Impact of Military Activities
During the Yugoslavia Conflict, June 1999,
http://www.rec.org/REC/Publications/YugoConflictAssessment/contents.html.
629. Id.
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Although the BTF effectively found four environmental hot
spots within the territory of the FRY, only three present
sufficiently egregious circumstances to require discussion under
Protocol I: Pancevo, Novi Sad, and Bor.630  In examining these
military targets, particular attention must be given to their locale
and proximity to the civilian population, the quantity of toxic
pollutants released into the atmosphere and the danger of
potential contamination for surrounding areas.
The industrial complex of Pancevo received some of the most
extensive press coverage during Operation Allied Force due to its
substantial environmental damages. 631  This industrial zone was
heavily targeted during the Kosovo conflict between the months
of April and June 1999.632 Although NATO strongly advocated
the military advantages of targeting such an industrial area, 633 the
Alliance's strike of Pancevo's industrial complex raises serious
questions under the standards of Protocol I. Pancevo is a heavily
populated town of about 80,000, and is located approximately
twenty kilometers north of Belgrade, the capital of the FRY.634
The targeted area included a petrochemical plant, a fertilizer
plant, and a major oil refinery at the southern edge of the town.
635
During a three-month period between April and June, NATO
conducted two air strikes on the petrochemical plant and fertilizer
plant, and seven attacks on the oil refinery. 636 The BTF reported
that "[a]s a result of the air strikes, various hazardous substances
were released into the environment, either directly from damaged
630. The consequences of Kragujevac's bombardment, although resulting in
considerable environmental pollution, seemingly failed to exhibit an immediate threat to
the civilian population as most of the pollution appears to have remained within the
compounds of the particular industrial site. See BTF report, supra note 618, at 39. Other
"hot spots" do seem to exhibit alarming capabilities for the spread of contamination. See
id at 9.
631. See Alex Kirby, Balkans Environment 'Seriously Damaged,' BBC NEWS (Oct. 14,
1999), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_475000/475015.stm; Alex Kirby,
Bombing Threatens Serbs' Environment, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 1999), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishlsci/tech/newsid_323000/323113.stm [hereinafter Kirby,
Bombing Threatens]; Serbian Toxic Fumes Fear, BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 1999), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/monitoring/newsid_322000/322483.stm; Alex Kirby,
UN Team Sifts Serb Pollution, BBC NEWS (July 23, 1999), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_401000/401981.stm.
632. BTF Report, supra note 620, at 33.
633. Id.
634. Id. at 32.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 33.
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storage facilities, or as a result of fires, with the most obvious
visual impact being the dense clouds of black smoke which poured
from burning installations." 637 Following the formation of these
black clouds, a "black rain" fell on the area around Pancevo,
"heightening concerns about human health and long-term damage
to crops, soil and groundwater." 638  This cloud reportedly
contained the toxic gas phosgene, chlorine, and hydrochloric
acid .639
The BTF report came to several conclusions about the extent
of environmental damage caused by these air strikes. It is
estimated that approximately 2,100 tons of ethylene dichloride
(EDC) leaked into the soil and into the wastewater canal.640 The
report further indicated that about eight tons of metallic mercury
leaked, 200 kilograms of which reached an adjoining canal.641 The
subsequent release of mercury into the adjoining canal exposed
the civilian population to contamination through ingestion of
contaminated food.6 4 2 According to the WWFN, soil samples
taken at Pancevo were two-and-a-half times above the level of
mercury deemed acceptable by other countries' environmental
standards, such as the Netherlands. 643 The report also points out
that 460 tons of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) burned at the
petrochemical plant.644 Such a fire "would have released dioxins,
which are highly toxic, hydrochloric acid, carbon monoxide, PAHs
[polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons] and possibly phosgene into the
air.,64
637. Id.
638. Id.
639. Kirby, Bombing Threatens, supra note 633.
640. BTF Report, supra note 618, at 32-33. EDC is deemed toxic to both terrestrial
and aquatic life. Id. As it is highly volatile, human inhalation of the chemical in high
concentrations can disturb the nervous system and gastrointestinal system "causing
dizziness, nausea and vomiting." Id. at 92. In addition, EDC can damage the liver, kidney,
and adrenal gland. Id.
641. Id. at 34. According to the report, "[o]nce released into the environment, metallic
mercury can be converted into an organic form, methyl mercury, which is toxic and builds
up in the food chain." Id
642. See id. at 33.
643. Kirby, supra note 628.
644. BTF Report, supra note 620, at 34.
645. Id at 34-35. Dioxins are considered one of the world's most toxic organic
pollutants. Id. at 92. They are quite persistent in the environment and may build up in the
bodies of humans and animals, remaining for many years. Id Dioxins have been proven
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According to the WWFN, water in the canal exhibited PAHs
fifteen times above the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
limit for drinking water, while soil samples from Pancevo
"contained PAHs [ten] to [eleven] times higher than Dutch action
levels." 646  Finally, in addition to the release of dioxins, it is
estimated that 80,000 tons of oil and oil products burned due to
the air strikes on the oil refinery, resulting in the release of
noxious substances such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and
carbon monoxide.647 In light of the quantity of toxic pollutants
released, the environmental damage could spread to surrounding
areas around Pancevo and potentially Belgrade.
Another military target that resulted in considerable threat to
the environment was the bombing of the Novi Sad oil refinery.
648
The oil refinery is located in a heavily populated area of about
180,000 inhabitants and Novi Sad is the second largest city in the
FRY. 649 The refinery sits three kilometers north of the city center
and only two kilometers upstream of bank filtration wells used for
the city's water supply providing for sixty percent of Novi Sad's
drinking water.650 In addition, a groundwater table is located only
one to two meters beneath the surface of the oil refinery, without
any protective barriers preventing the flow of contaminated
groundwater into the bank filtration wells.651 It is estimated that
more than two-thirds of the oil tanks leaked or were seriously
damaged during at least twelve NATO air strikes between April 5
and June 9.652 Approximately 73,000 tons of crude oil and oil
products were reported to have burned or leaked.653 Due to these
fires, Novi Sad, and some surrounding districts, experienced
concentrations of sulphur dioxide for a couple of hours.654 The
to cause cancer while animal studies have shown that dioxins may cause "damage to the
nervous system, the immune system, the reproductive system and malformations in the
unborn." Id.
646. Kirby, supra note 628.
647. BTF Report, supra note 620, at 35.
648. Id. at 43.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 44.
651. Id.
652. Id.
653. Id. at 47.
654. Id. Sulphur dioxide is a gas bearing the potential to affect lung function in
humans, particularly in asthmatic individuals, while "[r]ises in levels of sulphur dioxide
have been associated with increases in hospital admissions and in mortality." BTF Report,
supra note 620, at 99.
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BTF estimates that these concentrations "exceeded recommended
air quality standards."
655
In addition, it also found that in the month following the air
strikes, refinery waste water channels were filled with crude oil
and oil products, creating potential danger of release into the
Danube. Although the BTF concluded that there was no
evidence that the air strikes resulted in significant adverse impacts
on the Danube aquatic environment, it emphasized the risk of
contamination for drinking water wells of the Novi Sad
population. 657  A WWFN team that examined the risk of
contamination in drinking water wells during the month of July
confirmed these findings. 658 The WWFN team concluded that "it's
clear that the immediate clean-up and stopping of the current
pollution coming from ... Novi Sad [is] vital. ' '65 ' The air strikes
on Novi Sad consequently resulted in considerable damage to oil
refineries, leading to potentially dangerous contamination of
drinking water wells for the civilian population of Novi Sad.
Lastly, the bombing of a copper mine and smelting plant
outside of Bor, a town of about 40,000 inhabitants in eastern
Serbia, resulted in significant threats to the environment.660 The
NATO air strikes targeted these facilities on May 15 and 17.661 As
a result of these air strikes, a transformer station providing
electricity to Bor was damaged.662 According to the BTF report,
the stations housed three transformers and 160 capacitators.
663
Although one of the transformers was removed prior to the air
strikes, the remaining two contained twenty-five tons of oil
each.664 It is estimated that eighty to one hundred transformers,
each containing one liter of oil, were destroyed.665
have been associated with increases in hospital admissions and in mortality." BTF Report,
supra note 620, at 99.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 47.
657. Id. at 43, 48-49.
658. Id.
659. Kirby, supra note 626.
660. BTF Report, supra note 620, at 48-49.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Id.
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The air strikes also damaged the power plant within the
copper industry. 666 This damage, in tandem with the consequent
reduction of electricity supply, interrupted the production of
sulphuric acid and resulted in the chronic release of sulphur
dioxide gas.667 This gaseous release reached such egregious levels
that the BTF team, on its way to the industrial site, could "already
smell sulphur dioxide several [kilometers] from the plant.'
668
After only fifteen minutes at the site, the whole group started
coughing. The BTF team estimates that "emissions could be in
the order of 100,000 [tons] of sulphur dioxide per year."670 This
situation presents significant concern to Bulgaria, as Bor sits close
to its border. 671 Environmental pollution in Bor has considerable
potential to harm not only the civilian population in Yugoslavia,
but also in Bulgaria.
In examining the legitimacy of the air strikes on Pancevo,
Novi Sad, and Bor, NATO should have considered the extent of
environmental damages and the scope of military advantages
sought to be achieved through the damage or destruction of such
targets.672 Although targeting industrial complexes might have
hindered Milosevic's troops, it remains incumbent upon attacking
forces to determine whether the destruction of these targets might
lead to excessive environmental damages and excessive harm to
the civilian population. An adequate analysis prior to carrying out
air strikes upon these targets might have led to the conclusion that
these targets were inadequate under Protocol I.
It is undisputed that all three objectives were situated in
densely populated areas: (1) the industrial complex in Pancevo is
located in a town of 80,000 inhabitants, only twenty kilometers
away from Belgrade, the capital and largest city in Serbia; (2) Novi
Sad's refinery is only three kilometers north of Novi Sad's 180,000
inhabitants; (3) Bor's copper mine and smelting plant are just
outside the residences of Bor's 40,000 inhabitants. 673 Because
these targets were chemical plants, fertilizer plants, oil refineries,
666. Id. at 50.
667. Id
668. Id. at 51.
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. See Protocol I, supra note 3, arts. 52, 55.
673. BTF Report, supra note 620, at 31, 42, 49.
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copper mines, and smelting plants, it is highly probable that there
would be a significant release of chemicals from explosions
resulting from air strikes or repeated bombardments.
Additionally, such explosions would be aggravated by the
flammable nature of these chemicals. The ensuing leakage of
hazardous pollutants could contaminate air, soil and water,
resulting in substantial danger to the closely adjoining civilian
population. Such dangers should have been foreseeable by
NATO forces.674 Consequently, the Alliance's election to classify
industrial complexes as military objectives not only resulted in
substantial environmental damage, but also appears to have
constituted excessive use of force as expressly prohibited under
Protocol I.
c. Bridges
In a strategic attempt to weaken Milosevic's military force,
the Alliance claims to have targeted select bridges through which
vital supplies for Serbian forces in Kosovo were transported.
675
By May 23, 1999, NATO air strikes had destroyed all the bridges
over the Danube with the exception of Belgrade.676  The
674. These consequences appear even more egregious as one remembers that
Operation Allied Force constituted a humanitarian intervention. NATO's objectives
encompassed weakening Milosevic's military forces in order to deter further harm to
ethnic Albanians. The Kosovo situation, however, never dictated an absolute need for
aerial bombardments as opposed to military ground forces. As NATO chose to target
these industrial complexes, thereby potentially threatening the health and lives of a large
percentage of the population, NATO sought to weaken Yugoslav military forces, an
objective that conceivably could have been more properly and efficiently achieved through
the use of ground troops. One might therefore view the targeting of Pancevo, Novi Sad,
and Bor as a remedial measure for aerial bombardments' incompetence to achieve the
results that ground troops might have been able to achieve more effectively and with less
peril to the civilian population throughout the FRY.
675. Press Conference of NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea and Air Commodore David
Wilby, SHAPE (Apr. 6, 1999) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review) [hereinafter Wilby Conference]; NATO
Backgrounder Given by Jamie Shea in Brussels (May 11, 1999) (transcript on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review) [hereinafter Shea,
May 11, 1999]; Backgrounder Given by Peter Daniel in Brussels (May 1, 1999) (transcript
on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review)
[hereinafter Daniel, May 1, 1999].
676. Press Conference Given by Mr. Jamie Shea and Major General Walter Jertz in
Brussels (May 23, 1999) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International
Law Review).
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legitimacy of these targets, however, is questionable. Some of
these bridges were not on major transportation routes nor did
they serve other military functions.677 In fact, some served as
water distributors in densely populated urban areas.678 Moreover,
it is doubtful that NATO took the necessary precautionary
measures in targeting the bridges. The air strikes were carried out
in broad daylight resulting in severe incidents of civilian casualties,
most notably the destruction of several buses and trains, as well as
a group of civilians gathered for market day.679 Although select
bridges clearly might have served military purposes, to allow a
majority of bridges within the territory of the FRY to be targeted
is likely unwarranted.
Under Protocol I, attacking forces must adequately
determine whether an objective is of a military nature and take
appropriate precautionary measures to ensure that civilian
casualties or injuries will be minimized.680 Article 52 of Protocol I
provides that attacks shall be limited strictly to military
objectives. 681 Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives
are limited to those objects "which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage." 682 Article 57 also imposes on "[tlhose who plan or
decide upon an attack" to "take all feasible precautions in the
choice of means or methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and
in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damages to civilian objects. 683  Article 57
additionally requires "[tihose who plan or decide upon an attack"
to cancel or suspend an attack "if it becomes apparent that the...
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
677. See id.
678. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Campaign, supra note 475, at 21; see also White
Book 1, supra note 596.
679. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Campaign, supra note 475, at 21.
680. Id.
681. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 52(2).
682. Id.
683. Id. art. 57(2).
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therefore, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. 6 84
According to NATO spokesmen, bridges were carefully
selected targets based on their services as major lines of
communication and supply routes.6 85 A closer examination of
these targets, however, brings such conclusions into doubt.
Attacks on seven bridges within the FRY were undertaken on
road bridges, mostly urban or town bridges, which were not major
routes of communication. 686 Moreover, one such targeted bridge
contained a drinking pipe, the destruction of which disrupted
water supplies in several parts of a major city.687 Undertaking air
strikes on targets located beyond main roads and serving mostly
local citizens renders their legitimacy questionable. United States
military sources have, in fact, declared "that bridges were often
selected for attack for reasons other than their role in
transportation" but were selected for their role as "conduits for
communications cables, or because they were symbolic and
psychologically lucrative ... ,"688
According to NATO Generals, "[j]ust focusing on fielded
forces is not enough .... The people have to get to the point that
their lights are turned off, their bridges are blocked so they can't
get to work. 689  Targeting bridges that have a purely
psychological importance or do not serve the transport of military
supplies fails to satisfy the standards of Protocol 1.690 Article 52
requires that targets be limited to those that make an effective
contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a
definite military advantage. 691 It is therefore doubtful that the
targeting of bridges serving mostly local citizens and bearing great
psychological significance for the civilian population would
constitute a legitimate military object. Moreover, such attacks
684. Id.
685. Wilby Conference, supra note 677; Shea, May 11, 1999, supra note 677; Daniel,
May 1, 1999, supra note 677.
686. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 395, at 21.
687. White Book 1, supra note 598; ICRC News 99/25, supra note 596.
688. Human Rights Watch, supra note 395, at 21.
689. Robert Hayden, Humanitarian Hypocrisy, JURIST (1999), at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hayden.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2000).
690. Id.
691. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 52(2).
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seem excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by
these bridges' destruction.
NATO did not appear to have taken all necessary
precautions to prevent excessive harm to the civilian population.
Most of the attacks on bridges were undertaken during daylight
hours when civilians would be prone to travel upon such
bridges. 692  In one particular incident, a mid-day attack on a
bridge in the town of Varvarin on May 30, 1999, resulted in the
deaths of nine civilians, while forty others were wounded.693 The
attack was undertaken at one o'clock in the afternoon on market
day, where a crowd had amassed for the town's market.
694
Although NATO spokesman Jamie Shea announced that NATO
"bombed a legitimate designated military target[,]" according to
Lieutenant General Michael Short, subsequent to the incident, the
air pilots were ordered not to attack bridges during daylight hours,
on weekends, on market days, or on holidays.
695
Other daylight attacks on bridges resulted in the deaths of
numerous civilians traveling in public transportation vehicles.
696
In one particular incident, a bomb designated for a railway bridge
struck a passenger train traveling upon the bridge when the bomb
hit its target.697- Two carriages were completely destroyed, while
other carriages were heavily damaged.698  The attack was
undertaken around noon, on April 12, and resulted in the deaths
of twenty civilians.699  In another particular incident, a bomb
692. Human Rights Watch, supra note 395, at 21; see also White Book 1, supra note
598; White Book 2, supra note 598.
693. Human Rights Watch, supra note 395, app. A (discussing incidents of civilian
deaths in Operation Allied Force).
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. These include: the "old bridge" over the Zapadna Morava river in the center of
Trstenik (3:15 p.m.), killing two civilians and wounding fifteen; the "12 February" bridge
over the Nisava river in downtown Nis (4 p.m.), killing two civilians; the Cekavicki bridge
over the Jablanica river near Pertate (1:25 p.m.), killing two civilians, wounding one; the
Varvarin bridge over the Velika Morava (1 p.m.), killing nine civilians and wounding forty;
the bridge in the Grdelica gorge (11:40 a.m.), killing twenty civilians; the bridge near the
village of Luzane (1:40 p.m.), killing thirty-nine civilians, wounding thirteen. Human
Rights Watch, supra note 395, app. A; White Book 1, supra note 598; White Book 2, supra
note 598.
697. This incident occurred at the bridge over the Grdelica Klisura gorge. Human
Rights Watch, supra note 395, at 34.
698. Id.
699. Id.
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designated for a bridge landed on a bus, full of passengers.700 The
attack was undertaken at 1:40 p.m., on May 1, and resulted in the
deaths of thirtnine civilians, while thirteen others sustained
severe injuries.
Even if these bridges had constituted legitimate military
targets, it is doubtful that adequate precautionary measures were
undertaken to prevent excessive civilian casualties, particularly in
light of NATO's concession that it needed to change its tactics
subsequent to the Varvarin incident. It is indisputable that more
civilians travel during daylight hours than at one or two in the
morning. Moreover, these incidents occurred when military forces
were not traveling upon the bridges at the time of the attacks.
Therefore, one might conclude that undertaking such air strikes
during daylight hours effectively bore no strategic military
purpose.70 Thus, it appears that NATO failed to take all
adequate precautions to prevent excessive civilian casualties and
injuries in accordance with Article 57 when it chose to conduct air
strikes in broad daylight.
In examining all these targets, the Alliance's strategy appears
to resemble a psychological warfare of attrition. Although it is
certain that the destruction of some bridges served tangible
military purposes, it is also certain that the destruction of a large
percentage of such bridges resulted solely in civilian damage, while
inflicting little harm to Serbian military forces. It is the
responsibility of attacking forces to adequately gauge the
efficiency of air strikes and to properly determine the most
effective course of action. In the case of Operation Allied Force,
the Alliance seems to have fallen short of this standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo raised two main principles
of law: whether the intervention was per se legitimate and whether
the degree of force utilized by NATO forces was legitimate. As
the discussion above points out, it is gravely doubtful that the
events surrounding Operation Allied Force support the conclusion
700. The incident occurred at the bridge near the village of Luzani. Human Rights
Watch, supra note 395, at 43; White Book 2, supra note 598.
701. Human Rights Watch, supra note 395, at 43.
702. See id app. A.
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that NATO emerged from this conflict as a modern model for
future methods of warfare. The intervention was undertaken
without Security Council sanction at a time when the Security
Council exhibited a noticeable ability for concerted action. It was
also undertaken with considerable disregard for extended and
alternative diplomatic avenues. But most disturbing of all,
Operation Allied Force exhibited methods of warfare of
devastating consequences to the civilian population, causing
immediate damage to the civilian population as well as lasting
deleterious consequences for future generations within the
territory of the FRY.
It remains highly questionable whether the destruction of
allegedly quasi-military targets hundreds of miles from Kosovo,
bearing considerable nefarious consequences for civilians, and in
some cases causing the deaths of numerous civilians, directly bore
a relation to the welfare of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Equally
troubling is whether the Alliance's goals centered on ameliorating
the prevalent conditions within Kosovo-"genocide"
prevention-or whether the goals were to cause devastating
damages to the Serb population as an "entity," thereby negating
once and for all the possibility of any future Serb insurgencies.
This latter objective is well beyond the immediate needs of
humanitarian interventions and the confines of Protocol I.
Whatever NATO's motives or objectives, Kosovo remains an
unsettled region of the Balkans, a ticking time bomb of unsettled
hate. Weapons are routinely seized by American troops from
Albanian guerrillas, while Serbs and Albanians remain
sequestered to their respective cities or towns, unable or unwilling
to travel, fearing the possibility of brutal reprisal by either party.
So the question remains: what has NATO accomplished?
Conditions within Serbia will improve. Kosovo, however, will
remain a warring and dangerous province requiring the strict and
continuous surveillance of peacekeeping forces. As one looks
back at the highly developed methods of warfare exhibited during
Operation Allied Force, one can only hope that the self-
proclaimed "humanitarian intervention" in the Kosovo conflict
will not serve as the model for future internal conflicts in some
Western state.
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